Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior by Achtenberg, David Jacks
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 5 Article 9 
2005 
Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior 
David Jacks Achtenberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2183 (2005). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss5/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 
Debate Over Respondeat Superior 
Cover Page Footnote 
Associate Professor and Law Foundation Scholar, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. J.D., 
1973, University of Chicago School of Law; B.A., 1970, Harvard University. I thank Miriam Jacks 
Achtenberg, Mark Berger, Barbara Glesner-Fines, H. Alice Jacks, Nancy Levit, Colin Picker, and Allen 
Rostron for their intellectual and moral support and for their gracious and constructive comments on 
earlier drafts of this Article. I received invaluable research assistance from Summer Duke, Nicole Hanna, 
Angela Higgins, Monika Jenkins, Jin Liu, Jo Powers, and Jesse Sendejas. Librarians and staff members at 
the Leon E. Bloch Law Library and various libraries throughout the country provided assistance and 
access to sources without which this Article could not have been written. Research for this Article was 
supported by generous grants from the UMKC Law Foundation. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss5/9 
ARTICLE
TAKING HISTORY SERIOUSLY: MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND THE
DEBATE OVER RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
David Jacks Achtenberg*
INTROD U CTIO N ..................................................................................... 2184
I. THE CURRENT STANDARDS FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
U NDER M ONELL ....................................................................... 2186
A. Monell's Four Routes to Municipal Liability .................. 2187
1. Formal Policy-Based Liability ..................................... 2188
2. Custom -Based Liability ................................................ 2188
3. Training/Supervision-Based Liability ......................... 2189
4. H iring-Based Liability .................................................. 2189
5. The Overarching Requirement: Actions of City
Policym akers ................................................................. 2190
B. The Idiosyncratic Stinginess
of M onell's Four Theories ................................................. 2191
II. MONELL'S MISREADING OF THE COMMON LAW
BACKGROUND AND THE REAL NINETEENTH-CENTURY
RATIONALES FOR RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR .......................... 2196
A. The Nineteenth-Century Rationales for Respondeat
Superior ............................................................................... 2197
1. Liability Based on the Legal Unity of Master and
Servant ........................................................................... 2197
2. Liability Based on the Master's Legal Power to
Control and Direct the Servant ................................... 2198
* Associate Professor and Law Foundation Scholar, University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law. J.D., 1973, University of Chicago School of Law; B.A., 1970,
Harvard University. I thank Miriam Jacks Achtenberg, Mark Berger, Barbara
Glesner-Fines, H. Alice Jacks, Nancy Levit, Colin Picker, and Allen Rostron for their
intellectual and moral support and for their gracious and constructive comments on
earlier drafts of this Article. I received invaluable research assistance from Summer
Duke, Nicole Hanna, Angela Higgins, Monika Jenkins, Jin Liu, Jo Powers, and Jesse
Sendejas. Librarians and staff members at the Leon E. Bloch Law Library and
various libraries throughout the country provided assistance and access to sources
without which this Article could not have been written. Research for this Article was
supported by generous grants from the UMKC Law Foundation.
2183
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
3. Liability Based on Implicit Warranty of Servant's
G ood C onduct ............................................................... 2200
4. Liability Based on the Reciprocal Relationship
Between Benefits and Liabilities ................................ 2202
B. The Rationales for Respondeat Superior and the
Sherm an A m endm ent ........................................................ 2203
C. The Monell Court's Supposed Rationales for
R espondeat Superior .......................................................... 2204
1. The Supposed Community-Wide Loss-Spreading
R ationale ........................................................................ 2205
2. The Supposed Loss-Prevention Rationale ................ 2209
D. An Aside on the Sherman Amendment Opponents'
Principal A rgum ents .......................................................... 2212
III. NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMMON LAW AND MUNICIPAL
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR .......................................................... 2217
A. The Discretionary-Ministerial Distinction ...................... 2220
B. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction .................... 2222
IV. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMMON LAW AND THE
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY ARGUMENT OVER MONELL ..... 2228
A. Focusing on Common Law Rules: Using Nineteenth-
Century Public Officer Liability Theory to Support
M o n ell .................................................................................. 2230
1. Nineteenth-Century Public Officer Theory ............... 2232
2. Nineteenth-Century Theories of Public Officer
Liability and Monell's Four Routes ............................ 2233
3. Nineteenth-Century Cities as Public Officers ........... 2237
4. Nineteenth-Century Cities and Moneil's "Official
Policymaker" Requirement ......................................... 2239
B. Focusing on the Common Law Process: Using the
Nineteenth-Century Rationales to Overturn Monell ..... 2240
1. The Common Law Process: Applying Unchanging
Principles to a Changing Society ................................. 2241
2. The Common Law Process and the Governmental-
Proprietary D istinction ................................................ 2244
C O N CLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 2248
INTRODUCTION
The Monell doctrine' - the most important obstacle to municipal §
19832 liability for constitutional wrongs-hangs by a thread. Four
1. The doctrine is named after Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978), and refers to a series of cases exempting cities from 42 U.S.C. § 1983
respondeat superior liability, while subjecting cities to § 1983 liability in a narrowly
defined set of situations. See infra Part I (explaining the doctrine).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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Justices of the United States Supreme Court have called for
reexamination of Monell's conclusion that cities are exempt from
respondeat superior liability for their employees' unconstitutional
conduct.3 Plaintiffs' civil rights lawyers wait only for the right case
and a single change in the Court's personnel before urging the Court
to overturn Monel.
This Article is intended to provide those lawyers-and those who
will oppose them-with a comprehensive, accurate examination of the
relevant historical background,' and an equally comprehensive
description of new historical arguments for overruling Monell5 and for
reaffirming it.6 This new work is needed because Monell relies on an
historical analysis that is simply wrong,7 while Monell's critics rely on
an analysis that is so incomplete that it is grossly misleading.' Each
side relies on history, but neither side has its history right.9
The following pages attempt to correct and complete the historical
record. Part I describes the current standards for municipal § 1983
liability under Monell: the rejection of respondeat superior and the
creation of four categories of conduct for which cities can be held
liable. It then discusses the idiosyncratically narrow nature of those
four categories.
Part II shows that Monell's historical arguments for rejecting
municipal respondeat superior are wrong. It explains that Monell
ignored the actual nineteenth-century rationales for respondeat
superior and as a result misinterpreted the rejection of a proposal
(known as the "Sherman Amendment") to make cities liable for
injuries resulting from Ku Klux Klan depredations. It demonstrates
that the rejection of that proposal not only was consistent with the
nineteenth-century rationales for respondeat superior but also was
compelled by those rationales.
Part III shows that Monell's opponents' current arguments are
equally counter-historical. It explains that, while nineteenth-century
common law did recognize municipal respondeat superior, the
practical significance of that recognition was drastically diminished by
3. Bd. of County Cmm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-37 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.); id. at 416, 429-30 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Stevens and Breyer, JJ.).
4. See infra Parts II-III.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Of course, history will not be all that the parties argue. They may assert that
the statutory text supports their respective positions, and they will undoubtedly argue
that their chosen interpretations will best serve the public interest. Monell's
supporters will argue stare decisis. This Article focuses on history because historical
arguments have been central to the defense and criticism of Monell and because an
accurate understanding of history may make it more difficult to disguise policy
arguments by dressing them in pseudo-historical clothes.
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a doctrine that treated a large and crucial group of city-paid workers
as employees of the state rather than the city. As a result,
incorporation of nineteenth-century common law rules would not, as
Monell's opponents suggest, lead to restoration of meaningful
municipal respondeat superior.
Part IV attempts to reframe the arguments on sound historical
foundations. Part IV.A suggests that the Court should treat § 1983 as
implicitly incorporating substantive nineteenth-century common law
doctrine. It then shows that the now-forgotten (but then well-known)
"public officer" liability doctrine provides a solid historical foundation
both for Monell's rejection of respondeat superior and for its four
theories of municipal liability. Section B attacks the foundation of
that approach and suggests that the enacting Congress would have
expected courts to treat the common law not as a set of ironclad rules,
but instead as a flexible decision-making process in which unchanging
fundamental principles-in this case, the rationales for respondeat
superior-were applied to a changing world. It then shows that
application of that process to current municipal employment relations
would lead to reinstating respondeat superior.
I. THE CURRENT STANDARDS FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER
MONELL
For more than forty years, the Supreme Court has struggled to
decide whether and when municipalities should be liable under 42
U.S.C. § 19831" for constitutional wrongs committed by their officials
and employees. The tale of the Court's halting efforts to map this
territory is well known: In its 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,12 the
10. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 is derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (also known as the "Ku Klux Act"). Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13. The Ku Klux Act was enacted by the Forty-Second Congress.
11. For convenience and brevity, the terms "city" or "municipality" will be used in
their broad sense to include all local governmental entities including cities, other
municipal corporations, towns, counties, school districts, other special purpose
districts, and boards. Narrower terms will be used when the characteristics of a
particular type of entity are crucial.
12. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
[Vol. 732186
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Court concluded that cities could never be sued under § 1983 because
they were not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. 3
Seventeen years later, in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 4 the
Court reversed field, holding that cities were persons and could be
sued under the statute.15 However, after holding that cities could be
held liable, the Monell Court significantly restricted the scope of their
liability. A city, the Court stated, should not be found liable merely
because it employed the constitutional wrongdoer, that is, it should
not be liable on a respondeat superior basis. 6 Instead, a city was to be
held responsible only if the employee's action implemented or
executed "official municipal policy."17 Recognizing that the phrase
"official municipal policy" provided more of a "sketch" than a map,
the Monell Court did not attempt to define "the full contours of
municipal liability under § 1983," leaving that effort for "another
day.""8 More than a quarter of a century later, those contours are still
shifting and ill-defined.19
A. Monell's Four Routes to Municipal Liability
A detailed description of the boundaries of the "Monell doctrine,"
(that is, the theories of municipal liability established by Monell and
its progeny)2° is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief,
simplified description will be useful. In its current incarnation, the
Monell doctrine has replaced respondeat superior with four distinct
theories under which cities can be held liable: liability based on
formal policy, liability based on governmental custom, liability based
13. Id. at 191. Monroe was followed by a series of decisions that reaffirmed and
extended that holding. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (applying Monroe
to counties); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (holding that Monroe
protected cities from § 1983 suits for injunctions as well as for damages); Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (applying Monroe to counties).
14. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
15. Id. at 690.
16. Id. at 691.
17. Id. (noting that cities are not liable unless the challenged action was taken
"pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature"); id. at 690 (stating that cities
are not liable unless the challenged action "implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers"); id. at 694 (stating that cities are not liable unless action
executed the city's "policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy").
18. Id. at 695.
19. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988);
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
20. For ease of reference, this Article attributes the doctrine to Moneil. In fact,
the doctrine is the result of a series of decisions, see supra note 19, and various aspects
might best be attributable to particular cases in that series. For example, the standard
for training/supervision-based liability was principally enunciated in City of Canton
while the standard for hiring-based liability was spelled out in Brown.
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on inadequate training or supervision, and liability based on improper
hiring. The four theories, while sometimes overlapping, provide quite
different standards for determining whether a municipality will be
liable for its employee's wrongful act. A separate requirement cuts
across and modifies these four theories: the policy, custom, training,
or hiring must somehow be tied to actions by certain high-ranking,
policymaking officials.
1. Formal Policy-Based Liability
Under the first theory, a municipality will be liable for an
employee's constitutional wrong if the employee's conduct executed
or implemented an official policy adopted by the city's lawmakers.2
Moneil itself was such a case. The Board of Education and the
Department of Social Services had each officially adopted an
unconstitutional maternity leave policy, and the plaintiffs' supervisors
simply carried out that policy when they directed the plaintiffs to take
medically unnecessary maternity leaves.22
2. Custom-Based Liability
Under the second theory, a municipality will be liable if the
employees acted pursuant to the city's governmental custom, even if
that custom had never been formally adopted by the city's
lawmakers.23  Custom-based municipal liability recognizes the
existence of practices that might be considered the city's
administrative common law-a set of practices so well-settled that
they have the force of law.24  For example, a municipal police
department may have a longstanding, consistent practice of treating
domestic violence cases less seriously than other violent crimes, and a
person injured as a result of such a custom may sue the city even
without showing that the municipal policymakers had formally
approved the practice.25
21. Owen, 445 U.S. at 657; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
22. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 260-61
(2d Cir. 1976) (indicating that supervisors directed that the leave be taken). The
policy required female teachers to take a leave of absence after the fifth month of
pregnancy without a showing that such a leave was medically necessary. Monell, 436
U.S. at 661.
23. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. The custom must be that of the governmental
body rather than simply the city's inhabitants. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 166-67 (1970).
24. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
25. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695-96 (10th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 732188
TAKING HISTORY SERIOUSLY
3. Training/Supervision-Based Liability
Under the inadequate training or supervision theory, cities are
liable for the constitutional wrongs of their employees if two
requirements are met: First, the failure to train or supervise must be
so deficient that it shows "deliberate indifference to the rights" of
those with whom the employees will interact.26 Second, the failure
must have actually caused the wrongdoing to occur.27  Deliberate
indifference will be found where the nature of the employees' duties
or a previous pattern of violations makes it obvious that, without
further training, the employees are highly likely to violate citizens'
federally protected rights.28 Thus, for example, failure to train police
officers not to commit perjury does not, by itself, show deliberate
indifference since the officers should not need training to know that
perjury is unacceptable. 29  However, if the officers demonstrate a
pattern of lying under oath, the need for further training or
supervision becomes obvious, and the continued failure to provide it
will constitute deliberate indifference.30 Even if the need is obvious,
the city will not be liable unless adequate training or supervision
would have prevented the violation.31 Thus, the municipality will not
be liable if the officer would have committed the same violation even
if properly trained and supervised.32
4. Hiring-Based Liability
In quite limited circumstances a municipality will be held liable for
its employees' constitutional wrongs on the basis that the city failed to
adequately screen the employees before hiring them. For the city to
be liable under this theory, a plaintiff must show that "adequate
scrutiny of an applicant's background would [have led] a reasonable
policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the
decision to hire.., would be the deprivation of a third party's
federally protected right,"33 and that adequate screening would have
shown that "this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury
suffered by the plaintiff."34 A fortiori, plaintiffs could also prevail if
they show that the city hired the employee despite having actual
26. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
27. Id. at 390.
28. Id. at 390 n.10.
29. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1992).
30. Id. at 300.
31. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
32. Id. at 391; see also, e.g., Dorman v. Dist. of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 165-66
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (municipality not liable since better training would not have alerted
police officers to suicide risk).
33. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 412.
218920051
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knowledge of facts demonstrating this high likelihood of employee
misconduct.
5. The Overarching Requirement: Actions of City Policymakers
Each of these methods of establishing municipal liability is limited
by an overarching requirement that, for a municipality to be liable,
the constitutional wrongdoing must result from action or inaction by a
person who can be categorized as an official municipal policymaker.
Thus, formal policy can be seen as action formally taken by employees
who qualify as policymakers. Custom can be defined as a practice that
is so widespread that the municipal policymakers must have been
aware of it and may be deemed to have adopted it as their policy.
3 5
Liability based on inadequate training or supervision requires a
finding that it should have been "plainly obvious" to the city's
policymakers that further training or supervision was necessary and
the conclusion that failure to provide it showed that those
policymakers were "deliberately indifferent" to the high likelihood of
constitutional wrongs.36 Finally, hiring-based liability can only be
maintained when proper screening would have revealed the damning
background information to a municipal policymaker.37 Thus, every
form of municipal liability under Monell requires some form of action
or culpable inaction by an identifiable individual who can properly be
characterized as a municipal policymaker.38
The standard for identifying policymakers has evolved over time.39
In Monell itself, cities' policymakers were identified generally as
municipal employees "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy."4 However, this initial characterization was
sharply narrowed in subsequent decisions: The wrongdoer must be an
employee who has been given "final policymaking authority" to
35. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (holding that municipal
liability for custom exists if the policymakers have acquiesced in the custom); City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (same); Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915
F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the policymakers must have been aware
of the custom). But see Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 871 (2d
Cir. 1992) (noting that constructive notice is enough without evidence of actual
knowledge or acquiescence to senior policymakers).
36. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
37. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411.
38. See, e.g., Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
39. It is ironic that Chief Justice Rehnquist has been one of the most tenacious
defenders of the requirement of action by policymaking officials. In the Court's
private conference on Monell, Rehnquist stated that he could not "draw a line
between policy making officials and subordinate officials" for purposes of municipal
liability. Del Dickson, The Supreme Court in Conference (1940-1985), at 247 (2001).
40. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 122; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).
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establish the city's policy regarding the "particular matter[]. '4 The
city will not be liable if the employee has authority only to exercise
discretion rather than to establish policy.4 2 For example, a sheriff who
has final authority to hire deputies is not a policymaker unless he or
she also has authority to determine the criterion for selecting
deputies. 3 If the employee's authority is constrained by policies made
by his or her superiors or if the employee's decisions are subject to
review and reversal by those superiors, the employee's actions will not
be considered official policy.4 Thus, in its current iteration, the
Monell doctrine tightly limits the number of employees whose conduct
can be attributed to the city.
B. The Idiosyncratic Stinginess of Monell's Four Theories
This conglomeration of standards is idiosyncratically protective of
the municipal pocketbook. It is higher than the ordinary standard for
private employer liability,45 higher than the standard for municipal
liability for non-constitutional torts, 6 and higher than the standard for
individual liability for negligent selection of independent
contractors. 7 Remarkably, the standard for awarding compensatory
damages against cities under § 1983 is even higher than the standard
for awarding punitive damages against private employers.48 Monell
confines entity liability in a manner that is unique to § 1983 and exists
in no other area of the law.49
41. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483; see also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123. The question of
whether a particular employee has such authority is an issue of state law to be decided
by the judge rather than the jury. See id. at 125; see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).
42. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12.
43. Id.
44. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. If the employee's superiors review and affirm
both the decision itself and the basis for that decision, the city may be held liable. Id.
However, in such a case, it is the action of the reviewing officials that is treated as
creating municipal policy since only they are considered to be policymakers. Id.
45. See infra text accompanying note 50.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 51-52.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 55-68.
49. 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 905 & n.1 (2001) (recognizing that
respondeat superior liability is the general rule for both public and private employers
and that federal civil rights claims are the exception). For a discussion of a related set
of hurdles for recovery for sexual harassment under Title VII, see Ronald Turner,
Employer Liability for Supervisory Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Comparing Title VI's and § 1983's Regulatory Regimes, 31 Urb. Law. 503 (1999). For
a discussion of whether respondeat superior liability continues to be a valid basis for
liability under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, see Robert
A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially Implementing the
Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section
10(b), 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1325 (1997).
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Private employers are, of course, routinely held liable on a pure
respondeat superior basis for their employees' torts.5 0 Moreover,
where municipalities are subject to state law liability for non-
constitutional torts, that liability is uniformly premised on the same
principles of respondeat superior liability that apply to other
employers. The California Supreme Court's statement in Mary M. v.
City of Los Angeles5 is typical: "The doctrine of respondeat superior
applies to public and private employers alike."5 The author has been
unable to identify a single state that restricts its cities' liability for
employees' non-constitutional torts in a manner similar to the way
Monell restricts municipal liability for constitutional wrongs.
Monell's standards are even higher than the standards for liability
for the torts of nonemployees, such as a defendant's independent
contractors. Defendants are generally liable for the torts of an
independent contractor whenever they fail "to exercise reasonable
care to employ a competent and careful contractor."53 There is no
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate (as they must under the
Monell doctrine) that the tort was the "plainly obvious consequence"
of hiring the contractor or that adequate screening would have made
it obvious that "this [contractor] was highly likely to inflict the
particular injury suffered by the plaintiff."54
50. 2 Dobbs, supra note 49, at 905.
51. 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991).
52. Id. at 1344. There are a number of other state court decisions applying
respondeat superior to public employers. See, e.g., City of Lanett v. Tomlinson, 659
So. 2d 68, 70 (Ala. 1995) (respondeat superior applies to governmental employers);
Jesik v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 611 P.2d 547, 551 (Ariz. 1980) (same);
Scott v. Dist. of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 322 (D.C. 1985) (same); E. J. Strickland
Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 515 So. 2d 1331, 1336 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (same); Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 484 (Ga. 1994) (same);
St. John Town Bd. v. Lambert, 725 N.E.2d 507, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (same);
Wichser v. Major, 694 So. 2d 924, 927 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Williams v.
Bresnahan, 536 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (same); Stanley v. City of
Independence, 995 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Mo. 1999) (same); State ex rel. City of Havre v.
Dist. Court of Twelfth Judicial Dist., 609 P.2d 275, 278 (Mont. 1980) (same); Tice v.
Cramer, 627 A.2d 1090, 1094 (N.J. 1993) (same); Jones v. Kearns, 462 S.E.2d 245, 247
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (same); DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.
1995) (same); Teevin v. Wyatt, 876 P.2d 944, 947-48 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same);
Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 357 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Wis. 1984) (same).
53. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1965).
54. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412 (1997). Plaintiffs in
negligent hiring cases must, of course, establish that the injury was proximately caused
by the failure to screen, and this involves some demonstration that adequate
investigation would have shown a tendency by the contractor to commit the general
type of injury. Thus, for example, the fact that screening would have shown that an
independent contractor cable installer had traffic tickets would not have been enough
to make the cable company liable for sexual assaults. Strickland v. Communications &
Cable of Chi., Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Similarly, the fact that a bus
company's driver had a record of tardiness would not have put a school district on
notice that he would have been likely to sexually assault students. Giraldi v. Cmty.
Consol. Sch. Dist., 665 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). But Brown's "plainly obvious"
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Remarkably, Monell confines cities' liability for compensatory
damages more tightly than the common law restricts private
employers' liability for punitive damages. 5 Most jurisdictions award
punitive damages against employers on a respondeat superior basis
without any additional restrictions.56 Other jurisdictions apply the
limitations set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts -limitations
that are similar to, but far less restrictive than, the Monell standards.57
The Restatement provides:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or
other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the
manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was
reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting
in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
58
Various subsections of the Restatement standard roughly parallel
components of the Monell doctrine: subsections (a) and (d) are
requirement sets a significantly higher standard. In Brown itself, the Court held that
even a long police record that included public drunkenness, assault and battery, and
resisting arrest was not enough to make it "plainly obvious" that a deputy would be
likely to use excessive force in effectuating arrests. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 397.
Similarly, in Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001), the court held
that permitting police officers to work for a private investigator with a criminal record
that included arson, wiretapping, perjury, and bribery was not enough to make the city
liable for the officer's attempted murder on behalf of that investigator.
55. The Supreme Court has, of course, held that municipalities may not be sued
under § 1983 for punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981); see also, e.g., Schueler v. Martin, 674 A.2d 882 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996)
(holding that cities are immune from punitive damages under state law).
56. See, e.g., Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying North
Carolina law); Wiper v. Downtown Dev. Corp., 732 P.2d 200, 201 (Ariz. 1987); Fowler
v. Smith, 516 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Bradshaw v. Deming, 837
S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Several courts have described this as the majority
rule. See, e.g., Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575
n.14 (1982) (citing William L. Prosser, Law of Torts 12 (4th ed. 1971)); Fusselman v.
Ennia Gen. Ins. Co. (In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc.), 872 F.2d 642, 650 (5th Cir. 1989).
57. See, e.g., Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767
F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985); Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 666 P.2d 711,
716 (Kan. 1983); Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 879
P.2d 772, 776-78 (N.M. 1994).
58. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1979). Identical standards are set forth
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217C
(1958). Because the Restatement (Second) of Torts is the original source for the
language and the comments to it are more extensive, this Article treats it as the source
for the standards.
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somewhat analogous to Monell's formal policy route; subsection (b) is
reminiscent of the inadequate hiring route; and subsection (c) bears
some similarity to Monell's requirement of action by a high ranking
policymaker. However, Monell's restrictions are substantially more
protective of the employer. For example, under the Restatement, an
employer is liable for the acts of any "managerial agent,"59 while
under Monell and its progeny, the employer is only liable for the acts
of employees with "final policymaking authority" - authority that is
unconstrained by policies made by their supervisors and is not subject
to review by higher authorities.6 ° As a result, jurisdictions that follow
the Restatement have held employers liable for punitive damages for
the acts of such relatively low ranking employees as a Taco Bell shift
manager, 61 a K-Mart assistant store manager,62 the night manager of a
motel, 63 and even a Frito-Lay district sales manager who was
performing the duties of a route salesman servicing a convenience
store.'" In sharp contrast, decisions under Monell have held that
governmental entities are not subject to liability for the actions of
such high ranking officials as the city's chief of police, 65 a school
district's superintendent, 6 or the city's fire chief.67 Thus, it is
significantly easier to hold an employer liable for punitive damages
59. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 58, § 909(c).
60. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988).
61. Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1986) (holding that punitive damages
are justified against corporation because of knowledge and inaction by shift
managers).
62. O'Donnell v. K-Mart Corp., 474 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that
punitive damages are justified against nationwide corporation because of action of
assistant store manager).
63. Purvis v. Prattco, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1980) (holding that punitive
damages are justified against corporation because of actions of a night manager).
64. Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (holding that punitive
damages are justified against a nationwide corporation because of actions of
employee with title of district sales manager who was performing duties of a route
salesman at the time).
65. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that city is not
liable for actions of police chief because, although chief had authority to hire, fire, and
discipline employees, he did not set employment policy); see also Radic v. Chi. Transit
Auth., 73 F.3d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that there is no municipal liablity even
if employee had "authority to make administratively final decisions" unless he or she
also had "authority to establish official municipal policy").
66. Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1998);
Adkins v. Bd. of Educ., 982 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that a school district is
not liable because superintendent's hiring recommendations were subject to review by
Board of Education).
67. Greensboro Prof'I Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3157 v. City of Greensboro, 64
F.3d 962, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that city is not liable since only the city
manager and city council, rather than the fire chief, could make policy regarding
employment relations within the fire department); Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that city is not liable since fire chief's authority to discharge
employees was subject to city manager review).
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under either the majority or the Restatement rules than it is to hold
one liable for compensatory damages under Monell.68
Of course, the fact that Monell's constraints are stricter than those
applied for nonconstitutional torts does not necessarily mean that the
Monell doctrine is wrong. 69 But the fact that they are idiosyncratic to
§ 1983 does suggest that those constraints need a compelling
justification.70 The remainder of this Article will focus on whether the
statute's history and common law background provide that
justification.
68. Justices Souter and Breyer have also argued that Brown's standard for
inadequate hiring cases is significantly higher than the "reckless" hiring standard of
the Restatement. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 422 (1997) (Souter,
J., dissenting); id. at 434-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting). While Justice O'Connor denies
this characterization of her opinion, id. at 412, subsequent lower court cases suggest
that the standard is an exceptionally difficult one to meet. See, e.g., Piotrowski v. City
of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even if a policy of permitting
police officers to work for a private investigator with a criminal record that included
arson, wiretapping, perjury, and bribery was enough to make it likely that the officers
would commit some crimes, the city could not be liable because it does not
demonstrate that the city would have been indifferent to the particular crime-
attempted murder).
69. "Just because [friend's name]'s parents let him do [dangerous activity] doesn't
mean that I should." Unrecorded Lectures from Innumerable Parents. While the
Supreme Court has sometimes treated § 1983 as incorporating modern common law
tort principles, it has at least equally as often refused to do so. Compare, e.g., Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (relying on "the common law of torts (both modern and
as of 1871), with such modification or adaptation as might be necessary to carry out
the purpose and policy of the statute" to determine the standard for punitive
damages), Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978) (relying on the current
common law to determine the measure of compensatory damages), Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-24 (1976) (relying on current common law doctrine to
find prosecutors absolutely immune), Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (relying
on the "prevailing view [of the common law] in this country" to determine the level of
immunity to be given peace officers), and David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42
U. S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 497, 524-28 (1992) (discussing § 1983 cases applying contemporary common
law), with, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987) (acknowledging that
the Court's immunity standard was not embodied in the common law), Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1982) (adopting immunity standard unknown to the
common law), Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (common law
immunity defenses are only relevant if they existed at the time of enactment), and
Achtenberg, supra, at 502-22, 528-35 (discussing § 1983 cases that interpret the statute
without reference to contemporary common law).
70. The presumption against idiosyncratic interpretation expresses more than a
preference for intellectual symmetry: it is a significant protection against judicial
abuse. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). By requiring that courts decide cases according to
generally applicable principles, the presumption prevents courts from discriminating
between favored and disfavored parties or favored and disfavored statutes. In the
context of § 1983, the presumption in favor of applying contemporary common law
standards restricts the court's ability to judicially restrict the congressionally created
cause of action. But see Achtenberg, supra note 69, at 524-28 (arguing that, in the
context of individual immunity issues, this "dynamic incorporation" approach gives
state courts too much power to restrict the scope of § 1983).
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II. MONELL'S MISREADING OF THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
AND THE REAL NINETEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALES FOR
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Moneil's rejection of respondeat superior and its adoption of these
idiosyncratic requirements for employer liability were based primarily
on the Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Ku Klux
Act.7 In particular, the Court concluded that Congress's rejection of
the so-called Sherman Amendment-a proposal to make cities liable
for injuries resulting from the depredations of the Ku Klux Klan or
from similar mob violence -demonstrated that the enacting Congress
was opposed to vicarious liability and thus opposed to respondeat
superior.72 The Court also argued that loss spreading and loss
prevention, which it claimed were the sole rationales for respondeat
superior, were also advanced as arguments for the Sherman
Amendment, and that the Congress that found those rationales
inadequate to justify the Sherman Amendment would have found
them equally inadequate to justify respondeat superior.73
The Court's conclusions rest on historically inaccurate assumptions
about the nineteenth-century justifications for respondeat superior.
In 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, lawyers and judges saw respondeat
superior as the natural result of four underlying rationales which both
justified and limited employer liability: (1) the legal fiction that
master and servant were a single "legal unity," (2) the concept that
legal responsibility necessarily followed from the legal power to
control another's actions, (3) the belief that masters implicitly
warranted that their servants were competent and well-intentioned,
and (4) the principle that those who sought to profit from servants'
actions should bear the costs that those actions imposed on others. 4
While some of these rationales may sound strange to twenty-first-
century ears, they were well-recognized legal truisms regularly
invoked in nineteenth-century treatises and decisions.7s  To the
nineteenth-century lawyer-legislators who dominated the Forty-
Second Congress, these rationales were powerful arguments in favor
of holding employers (including municipal employers) liable for the
torts of their employees and were equally powerful arguments against
adopting the type of liability contemplated by the Sherman
Amendment.76 Rejection of the Sherman Amendment was not a
71. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-79 & n.7 (1986) (stating
that Monell rested primarily on legislative history including inferences from rejection
of the Sherman Amendment). To a lesser extent, the Court relied on a strained
reading of the text of the statute.
72. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
73. Id.
74. See infra Parts II.A.1-4.
75. See infra Parts II.A.1-4.
76. See infra Part II.B.
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rejection of those rationales but instead a straightforward application
of them.
A. The Nineteenth-Century Rationales for Respondeat Superior
1. Liability Based on the Legal Unity of Master and Servant
The first rationale rested on a concept that nineteenth-century law
considered inherently inseparable from the master-servant
relationship, the "legal unity of the principal and agent."77 Prominent
nineteenth-century commentators7" and innumerable nineteenth-
century courts7 9 explained that employers' liability for the torts of
77. See, e.g., New Orleans, Jackson, & Great N. R.R. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395,
453 (1866); see also Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Eshelman, 30 Ohio St. 647, 658 (1876) ("This
legal unity of principal and agent.., is an incident which the law has wisely attached
to the relation from its earliest history."); Atl. & Great W. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio
St. 162, 169 (1869) (stating that "legal identity of principal and agent, is fundamental"
and is particularly applicable to corporations because they can act only through their
servants).
78. See, e.g., 1 C.G. Addison, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 45 (H.G. Wood ed.,
1881) (stating that an employee's "acts are, in contemplation of the law, the acts of his
master"); 1 id. at 585 (holding that servants' acts will be treated at law as the act of the
master); 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *432 ("[T]he wrong done by the
servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself."); 2 Thomas
Waterman, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations Other than Municipal 537 (1888)
(describing the legal unity rationale as being "as old as the right of trial by jury
itself"); see also Norman Fetter, Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence 88 (1895)
(describing the legal identity of master and servant as one of the explanations for the
rule that notice to the servant is notice to the master); 1 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise
on the Law of Evidence 135 (12th ed. 1866) (describing the legal identity of agent and
principal as the basis for admitting agents' declarations against the principal). But see
2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Agency § 452 (9th ed. 1882) (describing
the legal unity rationale as "artificial and unsatisfactory"). Holmes discussed the
pervasive (and in his view, pernicious) effect of the fictional unity of master and
servant in two well-known lectures on agency. See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1891); Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Agency II, 5 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1891).
79. See, e.g., Kielley v. Belcher Silver Min. Co., 14 F. Cas. 460, 461 (C.C.D. Nev.
1875) (No. 7760) (holding that the act of a servant is considered at law to be "the act
of the master himself"); Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 1, 5 (1833)
(holding that acts done by persons employed to operate a coach or vessel are
considered at law to have been done by the employer); Bailey, 40 Miss. at 452 (stating
that respondeat superior is based on the principle that the "act of the agent is the act
of the principal himself"); Hopkins v. Atl. & Saint Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 9, 17
(1857) (holding that acts of corporate employees within the course of employment are
the acts of employer itself); McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil & Port Morris R.R. Co., 61
N.Y. 178, 181 (1874) (holding that master is liable for acts of his servants); Stevens v.
Armstrong & Squires, 6 N.Y. 435, 439 (1852) (noting that master is liable for acts of
his servants because "such servants represent the master himself and their acts stand
upon the same footing as his own"); Dunn, 19 Ohio St. at 168 ("The act of the servant,
done within the scope and in the exercise of his employment, is in law the act of the
master himself."). In at least one jurisdiction, "one could state a cause of action by
pleading the acts of the agent as the acts of the principle." Charles A. Rothfeld,
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their employees rested on the maxim that the acts of the servant
simply were, in the contemplation of the law, the acts of the master.
Blackstone himself had written that "the wrong done by the servant is
looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself,""0 and
American authorities consistently echoed the same theme. As one
court put it,
no general rule seems to be more firmly established ... than that
which holds that the principal is civilly responsible in damages for
the acts of his agents, whether negligent or wilful, done in his
employment, to the same extent as if the principal himself were the
actual wrong-doer.... What is the principle upon which this rule of
damages is founded? It is that the act of the agent is the act of the
principal himself.81
The legal unity of master and servant was, of course, a legal fiction,
and it sounds as odd to modern ears as the related rule that a husband
was liable for his wife's torts because "husband and wife are one
person in law."82 Nonetheless, however arcane or illogical the legal
unity concept may have seemed to members of the Court in 1978
when Monell was written, it was a familiar legal truism to members of
Congress in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted.
2. Liability Based on the Master's Legal Power to Control and Direct
the Servant
The second key jurisprudential justification for respondeat superior
was the belief that liability naturally flowed from the employer's legal
power to control or direct his servant's actions. The importance
nineteenth-century courts placed on this rationale can hardly be
overemphasized.8 3 Respondeat superior was described as having been
Comment, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior,
46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 940 & n.28 (1979).
80. Blackstone, supra note 78, at *432.
81. Bailey, 40 Miss. at 452 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 453. Interestingly, even the nineteenth-century courts recognized that
these unities were legal fictions. Id. For a late-nineteenth-century explanation of the
derivation of the doctrine from Roman law, see Kingan & Co. v. Silvers, 37 N.E. 413,
417 (Ind. Ct. App. 1894), which explains, under Roman law, that the pater familias
was liable for all wrongs committed by any member of his family (including his slaves
and animals) because they were all deemed to be part of a single unity infused with
the master's personality.
83. In explaining respondeat superior, the courts often coupled masters' power to
control their servants with their power to select them. See, e.g., Du Pratt v. Lick, 38
Cal. 691, 692 (1869) (stating that the justification for respondeat superior is the
"power of selection and direction" of employees); Cuff v. Newark & N.Y. R.R. Co.,
35 N.J.L. 17, 23 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1870) (stating that the master is liable because the
master has the power to select, control, and discharge the servant); Ham v. City of
New York, 70 N.Y. 459, 461-62 (1877) (same); Maxmilian v. City of New York, 62
N.Y. 160 (1875) (same); Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 57 Me. 202, 214
(1869) ("The carrier selects his own servants and can discharge them when he pleases,
and it is but reasonable that he should be responsible for the manner in which they
2198 [Vol. 73
2005] TAKING HISTORY SERIOUSLY 2199
"founded on [the employer's] power of control and direction. 84
Courts described control as "the reason of the rule," 5 or stated that
''control alone furnishes a ground for holding the master or principal
liable for the acts of the servant or agent." 6 As one court summarized
the prevailing view, "'[t]he responsibility of the master grows out of, is
measured by, and begins and ends with his control of the servant."'87
The courts explained that masters' power to control their servants'
conduct created a duty to exercise that power and stated that breach
of that duty was the basis for employers' liability.88 Respondeat
superior "is founded on the power of control and direction which the
superior has a right to exercise, and which, for the safety of other
persons, he is bound to exercise over the acts of his subordinates." 9
Masters' liability was seen as the necessary consequence of their "duty
to so control [their servants'] acts that no injury may be done to third
persons."9 For nineteenth-century lawyers, the existence of this duty
was routinely recognized as an indispensable justification for holding
employers liable for their employees' torts.
However, the Monell Court, writing more than one hundred years
later, anachronistically discounted control as a justification for
employer liability. Relying solely on Harper and James' influential
1956 treatise on tort law,91 the Court insisted that "on examination,
[control] is apparently insufficient to justify the doctrine of respondeat
superior.' 92  However, the opinions of two mid-twentieth-century
execute their trust."). Occasionally, courts treated the power to select (rather than
control) the employee as the crucial factor. See, e.g., Kelly v. Mayor &c. of New York,
11 N.Y. 432, 436 (1854). In Kelly, the court stated:
This right of selection lies at the foundation of the responsibility of a master
or principal, for the acts of his servant or agent.... "The party employing
has the selection of the party employed, and it is reasonable, that he who has
made choice of an unskilful [sic] or careless person to execute his orders,
should be responsible for an injury resulting from the want of skill, or want
of care, of the person employed."
Id.
84. Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358, 378 (1858).
85. Palmer v. City of Lincoln, 5 Neb. 136, 142 (1876).
86. Painter v. Mayor of Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213, 222 (1863); see also Boswell v.
Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 489 (1857) ("[R]esponsibility is placed where the power [to control]
exists."); Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise
Independent of Contract 532 (1880) (stating that the master's "control of the action[s]
of the [servant] is the important circumstance").
87. Callahan v. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co., 23 Iowa 562, 564 (1867)
(quoting 1 Theophilus Parsons, The Law of Contracts 88 (3d ed. 1857)).
88. Cooley, supra note 86, at 532 (stating that a master's liability "must come from
the fact that one person has placed himself under another's direction and control, in a
manner that should impose on the latter the obligation to protect third persons against
injuries from the acts or omissions of his subordinate").
89. Clark, 8 Ohio St. at 378; accord Palmer, 5 Neb. at 142.
90. Cuff v. Newark & N.Y. R.R. Co., 35 N.J.L. 17, 23 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1870); see also
Palmer, 5 Neb. at 142; Clark, 8 Ohio St. at 378.
91. 2 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 26.3 (1956).
92. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978).
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scholars (or of various late twentieth-century Supreme Court
Justices93) on the wisdom of that justification are simply beside the
point. Monell's validity hinges on the proposition that members of
Congress, sitting in 1871, could not have rejected the Sherman
Amendment without implicitly rejecting respondeat superior liability
as well. To prove that proposition, the Court must identify what those
nineteenth-century legislators considered to be the underlying
rationales for respondeat superior-not demonstrate that twentieth-
century commentators disagreed with those rationales. After all,
members of the Forty-Second Congress could not have read a treatise
that was written years after their deaths. It is simply anachronistic to
transplant mid-twentieth-century treatise writers' conclusions into
nineteenth-century legislators' minds.94
3. Liability Based on Implicit Warranty of Servant's Good Conduct
A third nineteenth-century justification for respondeat superior was
the belief that, by entrusting work to employees, an employer
implicitly represented to the public that the employees were careful,
competent, and well-intentioned; and that, if that representation
turned out to be false, the employer was liable based on breach of
warranty. 95 Justice Story's influential Commentaries on the Law of
Agency96 taught that employer liability was based on the fact that "the
principal holds out his agent, as competent, and fit to be trusted; and
thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all
matters within the scope of the agency." 97 The warranty rationale had
93. In addition to its citation to Harper and James, the Court provided a puzzling
reference to Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976), suggesting that Rizzo
established that "the mere right to control without any control or direction having
been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983
liability." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58. Rizzo could hardly have shown that a city's
right to control its employees was an inadequate rationale for municipal respondeat
superior liability for damages both because it was decided before cities could be sued
at all and because it was a suit for equitable relief against supervisory officials rather
than a suit for damages against the city. In any event, Rizzo did not purport to discuss
whether members of the Forty-Second Congress thought that respondeat superior was
justified by the masters' right to control their servants-the crucial issue for the
Court's argument in Monell. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71.
94. It is particularly anachronistic for the Court to have relied on the 1956 edition
of the Harper and James treatise since that was the first edition to reject the control
rationale for respondeat superior. The immediate predecessor work did not do so.
Compare 2 Harper & James, supra note 91, § 26.3, with Fowler Vincent Harper, A
Treatise on the Law of Torts § 291 (1933).
95. This warranty rationale was closely related to the idea that employers were
strictly liable as a result of their selection of the servant who subsequently committed
the wrong. See, e.g., Kelly v. Mayor &c. of New York, 11 N.Y. 432, 436 (1854). For
further cases resting respondeat superior on employers' power to select and control
their servants, see supra note 83.
96. Story, supra note 78.
97. 2 Id. § 452, at 523. For similar, roughly contemporaneous English views, see
Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts 52 (1887) ("[T]he master 'is considered as bound
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its most obvious application in cases of fraud, deceit, and other
misrepresentation;98 but neither Story99 nor the courts treated it as
being limited to torts involving deception. Instead, it was invoked in a
wide variety of contexts including assaults'0° and cases of simple
negligence.' By the mid-nineteenth century, the warranty rationale
had been invoked so frequently 02 that courts described it as a "settled
rule""0 3 that expressed "[t]he foundation of the rule [of] respondeat
superior.""°
to guarantee third persons against all hurt arising from the carelessness of himself or
of those acting under his orders in the course of his business."' (citation omitted)).
98. McDougald v. Bellamy, 18 Ga. 411, 432 (1855) (fraud); Davis v. Bemis, 40
N.Y. 453 (1869) (deceit); Henderson v. R.R. Co., 17 Tex. 560, 573 (1856) (fraud).
99. Story described the rationale as applying to "frauds, deceits, concealments,
misrepresentations, torts, negligences [sic], and other malfeasances, or misfeasances,
and omissions of duty," 2 Story, supra note 78, § 452.
100. See, e.g., Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 57 Me. 202 (1869)
(involving passenger assaulted by railroad employee); Stewart v. Brooklyn &
Crosstown R.R. Co., 90 N.Y. 588 (1882) (same); Atd. & Great W. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 19
Ohio St. 162 (1869) (same); see also Weed v. Panama R.R. Co., 17 N.Y. 362 (1858)
(involving railroad employees unlawfully detaining passengers by stopping train and
refusing to proceed).
101. See, e.g., New Orleans, Jackson, & Great N. R.R. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395
(1866) (involving injury to person in freightyard due to railroad employee negligence);
New Orleans, Jackson, & Great N. R.R. Co. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242 (1859)
(involving injury to passenger due to railroad employee negligence); Vicksburg &
Jackson R.R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 156 (1856) (involving injury to livestock due to
negligence of railroad employees); Robbins v. Mount, 33 How. Pr. 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1867) (involving property damage due to negligent maintenance of building);
Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201 (1854)
(involving injury to brakeman due to negligence of conductor).
102. McDougald, 18 Ga. at 432 ("[T]he principal holds out his agent as fit to be
trusted; and thereby, in effect, warrants his fidelity and good conduct, in all matters of
the agency.") (paraphrasing Story); Goddard, 57 Me. at 236 (same); Stickney v.
Munroe, 44 Me. 195, 204 (1857) (same); Bailey, 40 Miss. at 455 (same); Patton, 31
Miss. at 197 (same); Stewart, 90 N.Y. at 593 ("The carrier selects his own servants and
agents, and, we think, he must be held to warrant that they are trustworthy as well as
skillful and competent."); Davis, 40 N.Y. at 453 (paraphrasing Story); Weed, 17 N.Y.
at 369 (same); Dunn, 19 Ohio St. at 169 (same); Carman v. Steubenville & Ind. R.R.
Co., 4 Ohio St. 399, 416 (1854) ("[Pjublic policy, and the safety of others, require the
master to warrant the fidelity and good conduct of the servant, and, although faultless
himself, make him liable for the unlawful conduct of the servant."); Keary, 3 Ohio St.
at 207-09 (quoting Story and arguing that the warranty should be enforceable by
fellow servants-an extension that was rejected by most state courts); Henderson, 17
Tex. at 574 (quoting Story); Lucas v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 41, 54
(1873) (same).
103. Allbritton, 38 Miss. at 265 ("It is a settled rule, that the principal not only holds
out his agent or servant as competent to discharge the duties imposed on him, but
'warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all the matters of his agency."' (quoting
Story)).
104. Robbins, 33 How. Pr. at 31 (holding infant not liable for employees' negligent
maintenance of building because infant is incapable of warranting employees' good
conduct); see also W. Md. R.R. Co. v. Franklin Bank of Bait., 60 Md. 36, 44 (1883)
(describing Story's position as "abundantly supported").
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4. Liability Based on the Reciprocal Relationship Between Benefits
and Liabilities
A fourth prominent nineteenth-century justification for respondeat
superior was the concept that benefits and liabilities should be
reciprocal, and thus that those who hope to profit from an activity
must also bear its costs. Because employers expected to profit from
their employees' work, it was fair for them to pay for their employees'
torts "thus making the benefit and liability reciprocal."'0'5 This precept
was seen as a crucial logical foundation for respondeat superior; and
an often-cited 1824 English case, Hall v. Smith, °6 stated it succinctly:
"The maxim of respondeat superior is bottomed on this principle, that
he who expects to derive advantage from an act which is done by
another for him, must answer for any injury which a third person may
sustain from it."107 American courts enthusiastically endorsed this
rationale for respondeat superior;"' and, by 1875, there was
"substantial agreement of judges [that Hall v. Smith accurately stated]
the reason of the rule making masters liable for the acts of their
servants." 0 9
Thus, nineteenth-century lawyers and judges explained respondeat
superior, not as an arbitrary historical artifact, but as the logical result
of four underlying principles. This does not mean that nineteenth-
century judges, any more than their contemporary counterparts, were
always consistent or that their reasoning was always transparent. At
times, their decisions emphasized one rationale rather than another.
105. Cardot v. Barney, 63 N.Y. 281, 287 (1875) ("[H]e who expects to derive
advantage from an act which is done by another for him must answer for any injury
which a third person may sustain from it, thus making the benefit and liability
reciprocal." (internal quotations omitted)); see also infra note 108. As discussed
below, this concept continues to be accepted as a legitimate argument for respondeat
superior. See infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
106. 130 Eng. Rep. 265 (C.P. 1824).
107. Id. at 267.
108. See, e.g., Huey v. Richardson, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 206 (1837) (stating that
respondeat superior is based on a principle that those who expect to benefit from
servants' acts are liable for the injuries they cause); New Orleans, Jackson, & Great N.
R.R. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 (1866) (explaining that because the law permits
masters to reap the benefit of conducting their business through agents, it is justified
in expecting them to pay the costs of their agents' torts); Cardot, 63 N.Y. at 281
(same); Hickock v. Trs. of the Vill. of Plattsburgh, 15 Barb. 427 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1853) (same); Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201,
208 (1854) (holding that loss should fall on those who selected the servant and "for
whose benefit and advantage" the work was done); Sawyer v. Corse, 58 Va. (17
Gratt.) 230 (1867) (same); see also Fetter, supra note 78, at 88 (describing reciprocity
between benefits and detriments as "the true reason" for the rule that notice to the
servant is notice to the master). Most American courts were unwilling to extend Hall
to its logical conclusion and refused to apply the rationale to hold employers liable for
the torts of independent contractors. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 (1866);
Clark's Adm'x v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 36 Mo. 202 (1865).
109. Cardot, 63 N.Y. at 287.
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At times, they combined several. At the edges of the doctrine, the
principles sometimes tugged in conflicting directions. 1° But one
cannot read the nineteenth-century cases without concluding that
these four principles were understood to be the core justifications for
respondeat superior and the crucial factors defining the doctrine's
limits.
B. The Rationales for Respondeat Superior and the Sherman
Amendment
The Forty-Second Congress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment
was not merely consistent with the nineteenth-century rationales for
respondeat superior; it was compelled by those rationales. The
Sherman Amendment itself said nothing about a city's § 1983 liability
for its employees' constitutional torts. Instead it would have added a
separate section to the Ku Klux Act making cities liable for damages
resulting, not from the conduct of their employees, but rather from
racially motivated mob violence occurring within the cities'
boundaries.1 ' Rejection of municipal liability for the actions of the
Klan and similar organizations did not suggest that the members of
110. This was most apparent when the courts dealt with the torts of independent
contractors because the reciprocity rationale (and arguably the warranty rationale)
militated in favor of liability while the control and legal unity principles argued
against it. See, e.g., Kellogg, 21 Iowa at 575 (rejecting liability); Clark's Adm'x, 36 Mo.
at 202 (same).
111. The crucial rejected version of the Sherman Amendment (the First
Conference Committee Substitute) provided in relevant part that cities, counties, and
parishes would be liable for property damages or personal injuries suffered as a result
of the actions of "any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with
intent to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or
by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 749 (1871). The Sherman Amendment actually went through three
principal versions: As originally introduced, it would have effectively imposed
individual personal liability for mob violence on each inhabitant of the city or county
in which the violence occurred. Id. at 725. The language of the amendment that
appears in the Globe, id. at 725, is the language of the amendment as it actually passed
the Senate. Monell mistakenly quotes a slightly different preliminary version that
Senator Sherman stated that he intended to introduce. Compare Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 702-03 (1978) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at
663), with Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 705, 707-08. The Senate promptly
passed this original Sherman Amendment, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 705,
707, but it was just as promptly defeated without significant debate in the House. Id.
at 725. The bill, as a whole, was then referred to the first conference committee,
which produced the version that is discussed above. That first conference committee
substitute also passed the Senate but was defeated in the House, and it is the version
on which Monell focused. Finally, a second conference committee drafted a third
version of the amendment that imposed liability only on persons having knowledge of
the impending riot and the power to prevent it. Id. at 804. This final version was
adopted by both houses and became law as section 6 of the Ku Klux Act. Civil Rights
Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13.
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the Forty-Second Congress rejected the principles underlying
respondeat superior; it demonstrated their fidelity to those principles.
The four fundamental nineteenth-century justifications for
respondeat superior-the legal unity of master and servant, the belief
that liability flowed from the power to control, the idea that masters
implicitly warranted their employees' fitness, and the principle that
liabilities and expected benefits should be reciprocal-all militated
against municipal liability for Klan outrages. The city and the Klan
were not a "single unity" and the actions of the Klan were not, "in the
contemplation of the law," the actions of the city." 2 The city in which
the Klan committed its depredations did not control the Klan's
conduct. The city could neither be seen as having held out Klan
marauders as trustworthy or as having warranted their good conduct.
Because the city had not sought to benefit from the Klan's actions,
there was no reciprocity justification for holding the city liable for the
Klan's misdeeds.
As a result, rejection of the Sherman Amendment does not imply
that Congress rejected the four rationales for respondeat superior.
Instead, belief in those rationales-belief that vicarious liability
should be based on the defendant's power to control the direct
tortfeasor, or on the legal unity between the tortfeasor and his
employer, or on the master's implied warranty of the servant's fitness,
or on the need for reciprocity between benefits and responsibility-
would logically lead nineteenth-century lawyer-legislators to vote
against the Sherman Amendment and in favor of municipal
respondeat superior. Each of those rationales supported respondeat
superior, but not one of them supported the Sherman Amendment.
C. The Monell Court's Supposed Rationales for Respondeat Superior
To conclude that Congress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment
implied a similar rejection of respondeat superior, Monell ignored
three of the rationales (the legal unity, warranty, and reciprocity
rationales) and unjustifiably discarded the fourth (the control
rationale) on the anachronistic basis that mid-twentieth-century
commentators considered it inadequate. Instead of dealing with the
actual nineteenth-century rationales for the doctrine, Monell assumed
that there were only two significant 3 justifications for the doctrine:
community-wide loss spreading and loss prevention. It then argued
that Congress had rejected both as justifications for the Sherman
Amendment and therefore implicitly rejected the only possible
justifications for respondeat superior.
112. See supra note 77.
113. The Court does not explicitly claim that these are the only two justifications-
it merely says that they "stand out"-but it treats them as the only ones that need to
be discussed. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693.
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The structural flaw in this argument is apparent from the previous
discussion. Even if loss spreading and loss prevention had been
important nineteenth-century justifications for respondeat superior-
and, in fact, neither was-they were not the only or most significant
justifications. As a result, even if Congress had concluded that those
two justifications were inadequate to justify adopting the Sherman
Amendment, that conclusion would not even suggest that Congress
had rejected respondeat superior, since the four dominant nineteenth-
century rationales (legal unity, control, warranty, and reciprocity)
supported respondeat superior while militating against the Sherman
Amendment. But even without the structural flaw, the Court's
discussion of mutual insurance and loss spreading fails to support its
rejection of respondeat superior.
1. The Supposed Community-Wide Loss-Spreading Rationale
The Monell Court's reliance on Congress's rejection of the
community-wide loss-spreading or "mutual insurance" rationale for
the Sherman Amendment suffers from an additional independent and
insuperable flaw: It is based on the false assumption that community-
wide loss spreading was a nineteenth-century rationale for respondeat
superior. It was not. The author has reviewed hundreds of
nineteenth-century cases discussing respondeat superior and has been
unable to find a single decision justifying the doctrine on the basis that
employer liability would spread the costs of torts to the community as
a whole. The Monell Court has mistakenly conflated mutual
insurance with the fundamentally different concept of reciprocity.
The opinion contends that a commonly suggested rationale for
respondeat superior is that "the cost of accidents [or constitutional
wrongs] should be spread to the community as a whole." '114 The
opinion argues that this justification was advanced by Sherman
Amendment proponents, who described it as providing "mutual
insurance," but was deemed an insufficient justification by the House
majority. As a result, the Court concluded that Congress would not
have considered the mutual insurance rationale an adequate
justification for respondeat superior.
However, a comparison of the actual nineteenth-century reciprocity
justification for respondeat superior and the "mutual insurance"
arguments made by proponents of the Sherman Amendment
demonstrates that Justice Brennan mixed apples and oranges.
Congress may have rejected community-wide loss sharing as a
justification for the Sherman Amendment, but community-wide loss
114. Id. at 693-94.
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sharing is neither the effect of respondeat superior nor the nineteenth-
century justification for it."5
Respondeat superior shifts the costs of employee negligence, not to
the community as a whole (as Monell suggested), but to the various
beneficiaries of the enterprises that profit from the tortfeasing
employees' efforts.'1 6 Thus, the employer who will reap the benefit of
good work by an employee must also bear the burden of any damages
the employee unexpectedly inflicts. Just as the employer shifts some
of any benefits to various constituencies of the enterprise
(shareholders, officers, employees, customers)," 7 the employer will
shift some of the costs. This internalization of both unexpected costs
and unexpected benefits is a sound economic justification for the
reciprocity rationale's dictate that those who benefit from an activity
must bear its costs as well.
The concept that "benefit and liability [should be] reciprocal""' 8 is
fundamentally different from the rationale for community-wide
115. The improbability of Justice Brennan's argument that Congress was opposed
to anything that could, in any sense, be called "insurance" is demonstrated by the fact
that mutual insurance justifications were offered not just for the versions of the
Sherman Amendment that Congress rejected but also for the final version that
Congress approved. After the House rejected the original and first conference
committee versions of the Sherman Amendment, a second conference committee
drafted a version that imposed liability on all persons "having knowledge" that the
riot was going to occur and "power to prevent or aid in preventing the same." Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 804. This version, like the earlier one, was defended by
its proponents as "mutual insurance." Senator George Edmunds, the Senate manager
of the bill, stated that the final version of the bill would make each person with
knowledge of an impending outrage a "mutual insurer for [his or her] neighbor." Id. at
824-25. Yet, despite this insurance effect, the final version easily passed both the
House and Senate. Contrary to Justice Brennan's belief, the House did not reject
insurance for riot victims across the board-only the particular type of community
wide mutual insurance embodied in the first conference committee version of the
Sherman Amendment.
116. The authorities on which Justice Brennan relies make this point clearly.
Harper & James, supra note 91, § 26.5 (explaining that respondeat superior "tends to
provide reasonable assurance that, like other costs, accident losses will be broadly and
equitably distributed among the beneficiaries of the enterprises that entail them")
(emphasis added); Prosser, supra note 56, at 459 (stating that under respondeat
superior, the employer shifts the costs of accidents "through prices, rates or liability
insurance"); see also Harper, supra note 94, § 291 (stating that the rulemaking
employer liable for his employees' torts "is based primarily upon the social policy of
putting the burden of an enterprise upon him for whose immediate benefit the project
is being carried out and such person's superior ability to administer the risk"). Of
course, no man is an island, and shifting costs to an enterprise may have some
tangential impact on any member of the community. But this impact is only
stochastically affected by the existence or non-existence of respondeat superior, or
even by the underlying liability rule. A community member who is not connected to
the employer may be hurt as easily by the fact that the plaintiff suffers an
uncompensated loss as by the fact that the tortfeasor's employer pays for its
employee's wrong.
117. 5 Fowler Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 26.5 n.15 (2d ed. 1986).
118. Cardot v. Barney, 63 N.Y. 281, 287 (1875).
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mutual insurance against wrongdoing, and rejection of the latter does
not imply rejection of the former. Social insurance against
wrongdoing could-and some have argued should-be created by
legislation, but it is not what exists under respondeat superior." 9 It is
one thing to argue that, because a city (like any other employer)
benefits from its employees' work, it should bear the costs of those
employees' misdeeds; it is quite another to argue that a city should
pay for damage created by rioters, who were not in any sense working
for the municipality's benefit. Rejection of the latter does not imply
rejection of the former. As a result, a nineteenth-century
commentator such as Judge John Dillon could entirely consistently
state that a "municipal corporation is not an insurer against accidents
upon the streets and sidewalks," 2' while at the same time recognizing
that cities were liable under respondeat superior for the malfeasance
of their own employees.1
21
Yet it was a mutual insurance argument-the argument that the
costs should be "spread to the community as a whole" 2 2 -rather than
a reciprocity argument that was made to justify the Sherman
Amendment. An analysis of the "insurance" rationale advanced by
the amendment's proponents 123 demonstrates that they were arguing
for community-wide loss sharing rather than for enterprise liability.
Congress's rejection of their arguments may indicate something about
Congress's view of the wisdom of social insurance for mob-inflicted
harms, but it tells us nothing about Congress's view of the reciprocity
rationale for respondeat superior.
Representative Benjamin Butler, the sole source cited by Justice
Brennan for the insurance rationale for the Sherman Amendment, 24
119. 5 Harper et al., supra note 117, § 26.5, at 19.
120. 2 John Dillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 789, at 917 (2d ed. 1873).
121. Id. § 789, at 918.
122. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
123. One opponent of the amendment (and of the entire act), Senator Allen
Thurman, also mentioned insurance, but did so in the context of the ancient English
law of the hundreds. He used the phrase "insurance" neither in the sense of
enterprise liability nor in the sense of community loss sharing, but rather to refer to an
effort to prevent crime by collective punishment. He explained that King Alfred the
Great had made each tithe (group of ten families) essentially hostages for the good
conduct of each of the tithe's members. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 770.
While Thurman used this as an argument against the amendment, Representative
Benjamin Butler used a similar argument in its favor. Butler claimed that no riots
could occur without the silent connivance of "the leading men of the community" and
that imposing the costs of Ku Klux Klan depredations on the community as a whole
would provide a powerful incentive to "men of property in the South" to use their
power to eliminate the Klan because otherwise their taxes would be raised. Id. at 792.
124. Only one other House proponent of the Sherman Amendment referred to the
mutual insurance rationale. Pennsylvania Representative William "Pig Iron" Kelley
spoke quite briefly and, like Butler, argued for the amendment on the basis that the
entire community would share the costs of the riot. Kelly compared the amendment
to Pennsylvania's own riot act and explained that it made "the whole body of citizens
insurers for the victims" of riots. Id. at 794 (emphasis added). Kelly explained that, by
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explicitly treated the amendment as a form of mutual insurance
through which the entire community-not just the enterprise that
employed the wrongdoers or the persons who benefited from their
conduct-would share the costs of Ku Klux Klan depredations.
We will not say to the man who has suffered the loss, "You shall
bear our losses alone;" but we will stand up manfully, put our hands
in our pockets, and pay our share of the loss, in order to make good
his damage; we will bear equally with him the burden and the
wrong. 1
25
Butler's speech responded to an attack on the amendment by
Representative Michael Kerr, 126 who had argued that it punished cities
even though they had no notice or opportunity to prevent the riot.
127
Butler made it clear that he considered that objection entirely beside
the point because his mutual insurance justification for the Sherman
Amendment 128 was a form of community risk-sharing rather than an
effort to shift costs to entities that were somehow responsible for the
wrong.
The difficulty in the argument-altogether on the other side-has
been that this has been treated as if it were a punitive section only.
It is not. It is an insurance section. It insures the citizen the
protection of the laws; and the considerations as to the want of
power to punish or the want of power to interfere with crimes in the
States nowhere applies to this section.1 29
Butler explained that Massachusetts's riot act, like the Sherman
Amendment (but unlike the riot acts of several other states), did not
require notice, and he concluded with a crystal clear call for
community-wide risk sharing: "And I desire now only to say to other
communities precisely what we [in Massachusetts] say to our own
communities, 'Bear ye one another's burdens."" 130  Thus, the
community was to share the "burden and the wrong,"13' not because
the wrongdoer was the community's legal alter ego or acted for its
doing so, riots had been eliminated in Philadelphia because city officials knew that
"tax-payers of the next year would take notice of their want of fidelity if they
permitted the riotous destruction of property." Id.
125. Id. at 792.
126. Representative Kerr of Indiana had served as a Democratic member of the
select committee that drafted H.R. 320 and was the principal spokesperson for the
committee minority that opposed the bill. See id. at 249; id. app. 46-50. Butler was a
Republican member of the committee. See id. at 249.
127. Id. at 792. For Kerr's comments to this effect, see id at 788. Kerr's argument
rests on the same basis as the control rationale for respondeat superior-that a
defendant's lack of the ability to control the wrongdoer is a powerful argument
against liability for the wrongdoer's actions.
128. Mutual insurance was not Butler's only argument for the amendment. See
supra note 123; see also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 792.
129. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 792.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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benefit or was under its control, but rather, because it was unfair that
one community member should have to singlehandedly bear the
entire loss, regardless of who was responsible for the wrong. Thus, if
Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment proponent's mutual
insurance arguments, it rejected something quite different from the
rationales for respondeat superior.
2. The Supposed Loss-Prevention Rationale
Monell also identified what might be described as a "loss-
prevention" rationale for respondeat superior- "the common-sense
notion that no matter how blameless an employer appears to be in an
individual case, accidents [or constitutional wrongs] might nonetheless
be reduced if employers had to bear the cost of accidents.' 13 2 The
Court then claimed that the defeat of the Sherman Amendment
necessarily meant that Congress would have found this rationale
inadequate to sustain municipal respondeat superior. Monell's basis
for this conclusion is somewhat unclear but it seems to rest on two
related arguments: that the Forty-Second Congress would have
considered this rationale constitutionally objectionable 3 3 and that it
132. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978). If Justice Brennan
meant to assert that nineteenth-century courts shared this "common sense notion," he
was probably mistaken. See, e.g., New Orleans, Jackson, & Great N. R.R. Co. v.
Bailey, 40 Miss. 395 (1866) (upholding respondeat superior liability despite argument
that nothing the employer could have done would have reduced the likelihood of
accidents). The author has been unable to find a single case that justified respondeat
superior on the basis that the number of accidents would be reduced by holding
blameless employers liable. This is not surprising: Such a justification would have
been inconsistent with the legal unity rationale because the wrongful acts of the
servant were considered to be the acts of the employer. In fact, it appears that
nineteenth-century courts rarely mentioned loss prevention of any sort as a
justification for respondeat superior. But see Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Thomas, 42 Ala.
672 (1868) (explaining that respondeat superior serves to protect the public and fellow
servant doctrine serves that end by giving employees incentives to prevent negligence
by their colleagues). When they did so, it was most commonly in the context of saying
that respondeat superior was based on the employer's power to control employees.
See, e.g., Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 (1857) (describing how respondeat superior is
based on the power of control that the master is bound to exercise for the safety of the
public); Palmer v. City of Lincoln, 5 Neb. 136 (1876) (same); Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St.
358 (1858) (same). As odd as it may seem to modern readers, more used to economic
and consequentialist arguments, the nineteenth-century courts appeared more
influenced by the fairness and distributional concerns embodied in the four rationales
discussed in Part II.A. See, e.g., Bailey, 40 Miss. at 395 (stating that, even if it is
positively certain that accidents will occur, it is fairer that the master bear the cost
than a stranger); Reynolds v. Witte, 13 S.C. 5 (1880) (finding that if someone must
lose from an employee's misconduct, it is fairer that the loss fall on the employer than
on a third party). The effect on the overall rate of accidents appears to have been far
less of a factor.
133. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (stating that the loss-prevention justification "was
obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment against perceived constitutional
difficulties and there is no reason to suppose that a more general liability imposed for
a similar reason would have been thought less constitutionally objectionable").
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would have considered it an inadequate policy justification.1 34 Neither
of these arguments is sound.
The Court's first argument-that the Forty-Second Congress would
have found the Sherman Amendment and respondeat superior
equally constitutionally objectionable-has been thoroughly refuted
by other scholars,13 and their analysis will not be repeated here.
Suffice it to say that the principal constitutional objections to the
Sherman Amendment were based on the fear that, by making cities
liable for failure to prevent Klan violence, the amendment would
compel local governments to create police forces or to assign
peacekeeping functions to existing officials. 36 In the 1870s, this was
considered constitutionally questionable under the then-prevalent
dual sovereignty doctrine that was understood to forbid the federal
government from assigning federal tasks to state or local governments
or their officials.'3 7 However, municipal respondeat superior liability
for wrongs committed by a city's existing employees while performing
municipally assigned tasks was not subject to those perceived
constitutional difficulties. 3 8 The Monell Court implicitly conceded
this point itself when it recognized that the opponents of the Sherman
Amendment did not object to imposing liability on a municipality that
exercised its state-created authority in a way that violated the Federal
Constitution.'39
The Court may also have been suggesting that the Forty-Second
Congress would have thought that loss prevention was an insufficient
policy reason to adopt respondeat superior. The Court seems to
suggest that, because the loss-prevention rationale was not sufficiently
persuasive to convince Congress to adopt "the only form of vicarious
liability presented to it" (the Sherman Amendment), the rationale
would necessarily have been seen as insufficient to justify municipal
respondeat superior."4 ' But, for two reasons, this argument also fails.
First, as previously discussed,' even if Congress thought that the
possibility of loss prevention was inadequate to justify adopting the
134. Id. at 692 n.57, 694.
135. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts,
48 DePaul L. Rev. 627, 631-35 (1999); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Reflections on Monell's
Analysis of the Legislative History of § 1983, 31 Urb. Law. 407, 419-28 (1999); Larry
Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 249, 258-61; Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. Rev.
517, 537 (1987); Rothfeld, supra note 79, at 943-46.
136. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 135, at 258 & n.36.
137. The dual sovereignty doctrine was derived from cases such as Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
113 (1870).
138. Rothfeld, supra note 79, at 945-46.
139. Monell, 436 U.S. at 679-82.
140. Id. at 692 n.57.
141. See supra Part II.B.
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Sherman Amendment, that conclusion would tell us nothing about
whether Congress had rejected respondeat superior, a doctrine that
was justified by four independent rationales (legal unity, control,
warranty, and reciprocity) that militated against the Sherman
Amendment. Second, a decision maker's rejection of a drastic means
to accomplish a particular goal does not suggest that it thought the
goal was unimportant. A legislature's decision not to impose the
death penalty hardly suggests that the legislators considered
deterrence of murder an unworthy goal, 14' and no rational court would
interpret the rest of the state's penal code on the assumption that it
did. It is equally irrational to use Congress's rejection of the Sherman
Amendment's extreme form of vicarious liability as a reason to
conclude that Congress was unwilling to use less drastic forms of
vicarious liability to prevent constitutional wrongs.
State law analogs demonstrate that it is not at all unusual for a
legislature to reject new forms of vicarious liability without rejecting
accident prevention as a goal or respondeat superior as a means to
that goal. Supporters of dram shop acts frequently argue that, by
imposing liability on tavern owners for torts committed by those to
whom they serve liquor, the legislation will reduce the number of
alcohol-related injuries. But the rejection of dram shop legislation has
not been interpreted to suggest that the legislature was not concerned
about preventing alcohol abuse or that it objected to victims'
respondeat superior suits against drunk drivers' employers.
14 1
Similarly, a legislature's refusal to abrogate the common law rule that
parents are not generally liable for the torts of their minor children
does not mean that it believes that preventing such torts is
unimportant or that it thinks that the victims should be barred from
suing minors' employers.' 44
142. Correctly or incorrectly, the legislators may believe that the death penalty
provides no marginal deterrence, that its costs outweigh its benefits, that its finality
makes it too risky, or that it is inherently immoral.
143. See, e.g., Thies v. Cooper, 753 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Kan. 1988) (recognizing that
Kansas had not adopted a dram shop act but also recognizing that employers are
liable for the acts of drunk driving employees while they are acting in the course and
scope of employment).
144. See Stonger v. Riggs, 21 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Mo. 2000) (recognizing that parents are
not liable for the torts of their children but also recognizing that the child's employer
would be liable). There were many nineteenth-century expressions of the same
principle. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garrard, 59 Ill. 51, 51 (1871) ("A father is not liable for
the torts of his children, committed without his knowledge or consent, and not in the
course of his employ."); Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476, 478 (1882) (same);
Edwards v. Crume, 13 Kan. 348, 350 (1874) (holding that the father is not liable for his
son's torts where they "had no connection with [the] father's business, were not
ratified by him, [and conferred] no benefit on him"); Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky. (1
Duv.) 317, 318 (1864) (same); Maddox v. Brown, 71 Me. 432, 434 (1880) (holding that
a parent was not liable for his son's tort where no master-servant relationship existed);
Strohl v. Levan, 39 Pa. 177, 185 (1861) (holding father liable for the tort of his son
where they were in master-servant relationship); Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 30 N.W. 922,
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Thus, Monell's legislative history argument fails to justify the
Court's repudiation of municipal respondeat superior. The rejection
of the Sherman Amendment did not signify that Congress had
rejected the only persuasive bases for vicarious employer liability. In
fact, for nineteenth-century lawyers such as those in the Forty-Second
Congress, the most familiar justifications for respondeat superior-the
legal identity, control, reciprocity, and warranty rationales-were
powerful arguments against the type of liability created by the
Sherman Amendment. If the rejection of that amendment
demonstrates anything, it demonstrates the Forty-Second Congress's
fidelity to the principles underlying respondeat superior: that master
and servant should be treated as a legal unity, that legal liability
follows from the power to control employees' conduct, that those who
benefit from an employees' work should pay for employees' torts, and
that those who hold out an employee as being competent and
trustworthy should be deemed to have warranted the employee's
good conduct.
D. An Aside on the Sherman Amendment Opponents' Principal
Arguments
Moneil's analysis of the reasons for rejection of the Sherman
Amendment is problematic in another respect: It focuses on supposed
reasons for rejection of arguments for the amendment instead of
looking at the opponents' actual arguments against the amendment.
The principal arguments actually made by the opponents of the
Sherman Amendment demonstrate why opposition to that
amendment was entirely consistent with support for respondeat
superior. The opponents repeatedly stressed two related problems
with Sherman Amendment liability: Under the amendment, a city
could be held liable even though it had no notice of the impending
depredations 45 and even though it had done nothing to cause, and
everything in its power to prevent, those depredations.1 46  These
arguments were pertinent to the Sherman Amendment-but utterly
inapplicable to § 1983-because of the recognized distinction between
liability for nonfeasance (the type of liability that would have been
created by the Sherman Amendment) and liability for malfeasance
926 (Wis. 1886) (holding father liable for torts of son only if master-servant
relationship existed). For a discussion of modern state statutes modifying the
common law rule, see B.C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes
Making Parents Liable for Torts Committed by Their Minor Children, 8 A.L.R.3d 612
(1966).
145. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 770, 773 (1871) (Senator Thurman);
id. at 762 (Senator Stevenson); id. at 788 (Representative Kerr).
146. See, e.g., id. at 762 (Senator Stevenson); id. at 770-71 (Senator Thurman); id. at
765 (Senator Casserly arguing that the amendment would be unfair in sparsely settled
areas where there were not enough police to prevent riots); id. at 788 (Representative
Kerr); id. at 791 (Representative Willard).
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(the type of § 1983 liability that would exist under respondeat
superior).
Both nineteenth-century and contemporary municipal tort law
distinguish between nonfeasance on the one hand and malfeasance
on the other (that is, between passive and active negligence).147 When
a city's fault consists of its failure to correct a condition created by
others or by natural causes (for example, failure to repair a crack in a
sidewalk), the city's negligence is considered "passive" (nonfeasance),
and liability accrues only if the city had actual or constructive notice
of the condition. 14 8  On the other hand, if the city's employees
themselves created the condition (for example, if they cracked the
sidewalk while removing a tree stump),149 no further notice is required
because the city employees' knowledge of their own conduct is
sufficient.15 ° Notice is treated as a prerequisite for suits based on
nonfeasance but not for suits based on malfeasance,151 and this rule
was at least as well-established in the nineteenth century as it is
today. 52 Thus, under then-prevailing tort doctrine, suits for the type
147. Some nineteenth-century sources made a tripartite distinction between
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance. See, e.g., Bell v. Josselyn, 69 Mass. (3
Gray) 309, 311 (1855) ("Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to
do; misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do; and
malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all."). However,
in the contexts discussed in this Article, misfeasance and malfeasance were treated the
same in the nineteenth century, and the two terms will be used interchangeably.
148. See 19 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 54:107 (3d ed.
2004).
149. Kiernan v. Thompson, 534 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1988).
150. See 19 McQuillin, supra note 148, § 54:181. Like respondeat superior itself,
this rule was based on the unity and reciprocity rationales. Nineteenth-century writers
explained that notice to the employee was constructive notice to the master because
of their "legal identity" and because the master had "avail[ed] himself of the benefits"
of the agent's work and therefore should be responsible for the agent's knowledge.
Fetter, supra note 78, at 88.
151. See Hogan v. Grand Union Co., 511 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (App. Div. 1987).
152. See, e.g., 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 789, at 918 (stating that no notice is
required when defect is caused by the misfeasance of the city or its officers or
servants); see also, e.g., City of Chicago v. Brophy, 79 Ill. 277, 280 (1875) (holding that
no notice is required where city employees created the dangerous condition while
doing street work); Mayor of Balt. v. O'Donnell, 53 Md. 110 (1880) (holding that city
was properly held liable even though it had no notice when dangerous condition was
created by employee of its contractor); Burditt v. Town of Winchester, 91 N.E. 880,
881 (Mass. 1910) (stating that where employees cause defective conditions, town is
deemed to have "notice by its servants and agents"); Hinckley v. Inhabitants of
Somerset, 14 N.E. 166, 170 (Mass. 1887) ("'There is no occasion to prove actual notice
to a city or town of its own acts, or acts which are constructively its own."' (quoting
Monies v. Lynn, 119 Mass. 273, 275 (1876))); Brooks v. Inhabitants of Somerville, 106
Mass. 271 (1871) (holding that no notice need be given when injury-causing road
defect was caused by town's contractor since acts of a town's servants or agents should
be treated as acts of the town itself); Russell v. Inhabitants of Columbia, 74 Mo. 480
(1881) (explaining that where injury-causing defect is the result of the acts of a third
party, the city is not liable until it has actual or constructive notice, but where the
defect is the result of the city's employee's actions, the city is liable without further
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of conduct for which § 1983 provided relief-misfeasance by a
municipal employee-required no further notice to the municipality.
Similarly, the second argument (that the Sherman Amendment
could make a city liable even though it had not caused the harm or
could not have prevented it) can be properly understood only in light
of nineteenth-century limitations on municipal liability for
nonfeasance. The argument of Representative Michael Kerr, the
conference committee's Democratic House member, is representative.
Kerr argued that the Sherman Amendment would be an unjustified
effort to punish a county for failure to prevent harms resulting from
the acts of unrelated third persons. 53 However, Kerr recognized that
a number of states did have similar statutes creating liability for
nonfeasance and specifically referred to statutorily created municipal
liability for
failures to keep up the public highways, failures to keep the bridges
of the county in good repair, or failures of cities to keep their streets
in safe condition, or failures to protect the people against mobs,
against open, numerous, riotous, tumultuous uprisings of the people,
leading to the destruction of property.154
Kerr then explained that these state statutes could be justified
because the covered offenses' public nature put the county on notice
and gave it an opportunity to prevent the harms.155 On the other
notice); Grant v. City of Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864) (recognizing
that notice was required for nonfeasance but not for defects resulting from work done
by city's contractors); Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323 (1882) (holding that
no notice is required when misfeasance of city or its employees causes the danger); 2
John W. Smith, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Municipal Corporations
Including Public Corporations and Political and Governmental Corporations of Every
Class § 1546, at 1618 (1903) (stating that a city need not have notice where defect is
caused by the negligence of a city employee). There appears to have been no
question that cities were liable on a respondeat superior basis for the actions of their
own employees, although there was a conflict among the courts as to whether they
would be responsible for the wrongful actions of employees of independent
contractors. See, e.g., 2 Dillon, supra note 120, §§ 790-93, at 919-25 (recognizing
respondeat superior liability for acts of municipality's own employees and describing
municipal liability for the negligence of independent contractor employees as the
better rule at least where the work was inherently likely to create dangerous
conditions).
153. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1871) (complaining that the
amendment "transferr[ed] the offense which [the individual] has committed to the
county").
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. (stating that the "very publicity of the manner in which" the offenses
occurred put the inhabitants on notice and noting that the English law of the hundreds
was justified by the fact that the inhabitants necessarily had notice). At one point,
Kerr interpreted the Sherman Amendment as covering "cases of ordinary crimes, or
of personal wrongs and injuries, such as arson, murder, larceny, assault and battery,
and mayhem." Id. This appears to be inconsistent with the language of the
amendment which required that the wrong be committed by "persons riotously and
tumultuously assembled together." Id. at 749. Kerr may have meant to emphasize
that the depredations, although committed by groups of people, might be committed
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hand, Kerr complained, the Sherman Amendment made the county
liable for nonfeasance without any such notice.
It is not required to be proved [under the Sherman Amendment]
that there was any previous indication of the purpose of these
wrong-doers, or that there were any rioters roaming over the
country, or through the community, that could put any portion
whatever of the people upon notice or even upon inquiry.
1 6
Kerr's choice of examples is revealing because road and bridge
cases were the prototypical decisions explaining the distinction
between malfeasance and nonfeasance and establishing that notice
was needed only in suits alleging the latter."5 7 By using those
examples, Kerr was referring to a body of law that was well known to
his many lawyer colleagues in the House.' That body of law
provided a powerful argument against the Sherman Amendment
because it taught that a city should not be held liable for the harms
caused by the wrongful acts of others unless it had notice in time to
prevent the harms.l 9  But that same body of law supported
respondeat superior liability, consistently holding that a city would be
liable without further notice if the harm had been caused by "positive
misfeasance [by the municipal] corporation, its officers, or servants, or
by others under its authority."" The road and bridge cases regularly
treated conduct by city employees as the city's own conduct, and they
did so even though the employees -usually street repair workers or at
most foremen-were ones who could never be considered
policymakers under Monell.16 '
in sparsely populated areas or so quickly that notice would not provide an opportunity
to prevent the wrongs. See, e.g., id. at 788 (explaining that, in sparsely populated areas,
small combinations could plan and commit the outrages so secretively that no one in
the county would know about them until they occurred).
156. Id.
157. See supra note 152.
158. Because that body of law provided one of the closest analogies to the Sherman
Amendment, it is not surprising that references to municipal liability in road and
bridge cases were sprinkled throughout the debates. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. at 792 (exchange between Representatives Willard and Butler).
159. See, e.g., 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 789, at 918 (explaining that where the
liability of the city is based on its failure to protect its citizens against dangers created
by others, the plaintiff must show notice to the city).
160. 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 789, at 918 (second emphasis added).
161. See, e.g., Monies v. City of Lynn, 119 Mass. 273, 274-75 (1876) (stating that the
negligence of a city's street repair employees is the negligence of the city itself);
Brooks v. Inhabitants of Somerville, 106 Mass. 271, 274 (1871) (holding that no notice
need be given to a town of its servants' conduct because there is no need to notify a
defendant of its "own acts"); 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 789, at 911-19 (treating
misfeasance of city's servants as equivalent to misfeasance by the city itself or its
officers). A number of cases extended this principle beyond respondeat superior and
made the city liable for action of its independent contractor's employees. 2 Id. §§ 791-
93, at 922-25.
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Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen's criticism of the Sherman
Amendment is also based on the distinction between nonfeasance and
malfeasance.162 Frelinghuysen argued that the Sherman Amendment
was improper because it made municipalities liable even though they
had committed no wrong. 163 He explained that, if the principle of the
Sherman Amendment were accepted, the federal government "would
to-day be liable to make compensation for all the damages that have
resulted from the rebellion in the southern country" because it had
not prevented the Civil War."6  Thus, like Kerr, Frelinghuysen
objected to the Sherman Amendment because it made a city liable for
nonfeasance-for failure to prevent harms resulting from the acts of
others-an objection that casts no doubt on his willingness to
recognize municipal respondeat superior liability for harms inflicted
by the city's own employees.
Thus, the arguments of the opponents of the Sherman Amendment
cannot reasonably be seen as indicating a congressional rejection of
respondeat superior or as supporting Monell's idiosyncratic limitations
on municipal liability. Instead, the debates demonstrate that
Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment because it violated a
well-established body of existing law that limited municipal liability
for nonfeasance while recognizing municipal respondeat superior for
162. An isolated quote from Senator Frelinghuysen is the sole basis for Justice
Brennan's claim that the rationale for the Sherman Amendment was loss prevention.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (quoting Frelinghuysen as
stating that "[t]he obligation to make compensation for injury resulting from riot is, by
arbitrary enactment of statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute is
to secure a more perfect police regulation") (emphasis added). This reliance is
misplaced for three reasons. First, Frelinghuysen was an opponent of the Sherman
Amendment and thus is an unlikely source to cite for the rationales that the
proponents offered for it. Second, it is far from clear that the phrase "to secure a
more perfect police regulation," even taken in isolation, refers to loss prevention.
Third, as discussed in the text, a review of the full context of Frelinghuysen's speech
makes it clear that his objection to the statute was not that loss prevention was an
inadequate justification, but rather that the amendment would impose an unjust
liability for nonfeasance. Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen opposed the Sherman
Amendment but favored the Ku Klux Act as a whole including section one of the
Act-the section that is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also played an
important but only recently recognized role in the drafting of that section. Although
Representative Samuel Shellabarger is usually credited as the author of the entire act,
section one was actually taken from an earlier bill drafted by Frelinghuysen. S. 243,
42d Cong. § 1 (1871). For a more detailed discussion, see David Achtenberg, A
"Milder Measure of Villainy": The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 1, 48-51.
163. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 777. One sentence of Frelinghuysen's
speech, if taken out of context, seems to suggest that he thought that cities can never
be sued for damages. "Why, sir,... a town, or a county is under no possible
obligation to make compensation for damages." Id. However, it is clear from the
immediately following paragraph that he meant that cities had no obligation, absent a
statute, to pay damages for failure to keep the peace-not that they never could be
sued for damages for misfeasance by their own employees. Id.
164. Id.
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city employees' misfeasance, that is, for the type of conduct covered
by § 1983.
III. NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMMON LAW AND MUNICIPAL
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Rejection of the Sherman Amendment shows Congress's fidelity to
the underlying rationales for respondeat superior but does not, by
itself, show that the Monell doctrine is inconsistent with the legislative
will.165 In order to implement the Forty-Second Congress's will the
Court must look farther: It must try to determine whether, and to
what extent, those rationales led nineteenth-century courts to apply
respondeat superior to cities as well as to private employers. This
approach is consistent with a line of cases in which the Supreme Court
has used the common law, as it existed in 1871, as a guide to the
meaning of § 1983.166 In those cases, the Court treats the common law
as a set of background understandings that are presumptively
incorporated into § 1983 unless there is a convincing reason not to do
SO.
165. This Article takes as a given that the proper goal of statutory interpretation is
to implement the will of the legislature. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (stating that the Court must give "effect to the will of the
Legislature"). This is far from a universally accepted proposition and many argue that
the Court should worry less about the goals of the enacting Congress and more about
the Court's own views about "consideration[s] of policy and practicality." John C.
Jeffries Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 Yale L.J. 259, 259-62 (2000); see
also Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 84-101 (1989); id. at 56-57 & nn.36-41 (collecting
sources). The author has previously argued that such an approach could be justified
only if the Forty-Second Congress intended to delegate such lawmaking authority to
the Court and that the "history of the relationship between Congress and the Court
during Reconstruction makes it exceptionally unlikely that the Forty-Second
Congress would have given the Court such unchecked power." Achtenberg, supra
note 69, at 531-35. Even if one believes that the Court often uses statements about §
1983's legislative history as a mask for its own policy decisions, a more accurate
understanding of that history should make such a subterfuge more difficult.
166. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. State Dep't of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (stating that
because the Forty-Second Congress was familiar with existing common law principles,
the Court assumes it intended those principles to apply absent evidence to the
contrary); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336 (1983) (same); City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) (same). The Court has not always limited
itself to the common law as of the date of enactment and instead has sometimes
incorporated subsequent common law developments. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (stating that the Court can resolve interpretative issues by
considering modern as well as nineteenth-century common law). As discussed in Part
I.B, modern case law does apply respondeat superior to municipalities and thus does
not support Monell. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
three inconsistent ways the Court has used the common law to interpret § 1983, see
Achtenberg, supra note 69, at 511-28 (identifying a "Golden Rule Approach," a
"Static Incorporation Approach," and a "Dynamic Incorporation Approach").
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In his dissent in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,167 Justice Stevens
invoked this approach to argue that respondeat superior should be
applied to municipal defendants in § 1983 cases. 68 Stevens argued
that, in 1871, respondeat superior was a well-established common law
doctrine that was routinely applied to hold both private and municipal
corporations liable for the torts of their employees.1 69 Because the
members of the Forty-Second Congress were well-versed in the
common law of their time, Justice Stevens argued, they would have
expected courts to apply respondeat superior to decide municipal
liability issues under § 1983.17° Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
disagreed with this broad characterization of the nineteenth-century
common law of municipal liability, noting that "certain rather
complicated municipal tort immunities existed at the time § 1983 was
enacted,"'171 and suggesting that these immunities at least muddied the
background understanding and cast doubt on Congress's intentions.
7 1
167. 471 U.S. 808, 834 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 835-41.
169. Id. at 835-38.
170. Id. Many commentators have agreed with this conclusion. See, e.g., Mead,
supra note 135, at 526-27; Rothfeld, supra note 79, 956-61. But see Kramer & Sykes,
supra note 135, at 249 (recognizing nineteenth-century prevalence of municipal
respondeat superior but arguing that it was mitigated by the governmental proprietary
distinction and proposing that the Court should turn to economic analysis instead);
Harold S. Lewis Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983's Asymmetry,
140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755, 766 n.51 (1992) (same, but proposing a modified form of
respondeat superior under § 1983 instead).
171. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 819 n.5 (relying on Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622,644-50 (1980)); Owen, 445 U.S. at 676-79 (Powell, J., dissenting).
172. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist made no effort to explain how the existence
of these immunities would justify elimination of respondeat superior or the creation of
the idiosyncratic standard created by Monell and its progeny. This Article attempts to
fill this gap by explaining how the governmental-proprietary distinction does
somewhat undermine the argument for municipal respondeat superior and by showing
how the nineteenth-century public officer doctrine might justify something similar to
the Monell doctrine. See infra Parts II.B, IV.A. Justice Rehnquist does refer to one
nineteenth-century case, Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511 (1837), and
suggests that it "seems in harmony" with the Monell doctrine. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 819
n.5. Thayer, like a number of other early nineteenth-century cases, stated that cities
were not liable for the unauthorized and unlawful acts of their "officers [unless it
appeared] that they were expressly authorized to do the acts, by the city government,
or that they were done bona fide in pursuance of a general authority to act for the city,
on the subject to which they relate." Id. (quoting Thayer, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 516-
17). However, these cases did not represent any Monell-like limitation on municipal
respondeat superior. Instead, they represented an early and restrictive interpretation
of the general "course and scope" of employment requirement-an interpretation
that was a minority view even at the beginning of the nineteenth century and soon
became even less representative. Rothfeld, supra note 79, at 957-59 n.100. (The
author shared Justice Rehnquist's misunderstanding of Thayer and made a similar-
and equally mistaken-suggestion in a brief submitted to the Court five years before
Tuttle was decided. Brief for Petitioner at 15 n.3, Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980) (No. 78-1779)). However, as Justice Frankfurter long ago warned,
"Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it
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But the nineteenth-century legal stream was neither as clear nor as
murky as the two Justices argued. Justice Stevens was undoubtedly
correct that late nineteenth-century courts routinely used respondeat
superior to hold municipal corporations liable for the wrongs of their
employees. The Ohio Supreme Court forcefully expressed the
prevailing view as follows: "We have again and again affirmed, that
the liabilities of corporations, private and municipal, are no less
extensive; and that the maxim, respondeat superior, properly applies
to them, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as in its
application to the liabilities of private individuals." '173 The Ohio
court's treatment of municipal respondeat superior as well-settled law
was fully supported by numerous cases holding municipalities liable
for their employees' torts.'74 As one Louisiana court put it: "The
liability of municipal corporations for the acts of their agent is, as a
general rule, too well settled at this day to be seriously questioned." '175
On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist was also correct: There were
two strands of nineteenth-century cases that did sometimes reject
municipal liability for torts committed by individuals on the public
payroll. Justice Rehnquist identifies these immunities only by
referring his readers to segments of the majority and dissenting
opinions in Owen v. City of Independence.'76 Those segments discuss
two lines of authorities: cases distinguishing between so-called
"governmental" and "proprietary" acts, '77 and ones distinguishing
between "discretionary" and "ministerial" functions.'78 However,
comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
173. City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 95 (1854).
174. See Rothfeld, supra note 79, at 957-59 n.100 (citing numerous nineteenth-
century authorities); see also Dwight Arven Jones, A Treatise on the Negligence of
Municipal Corporations § 161, at 312 (1892) (describing the application of respondeat
superior to municipal corporations as "thoroughly well settled"); 2 Story, supra note
78, § 308 (stating that, at least in suits arising out of public works projects, "the maxim
respondeat superior, properly applies [to municipal corporations], in the same manner
and to the same extent as in its application to the liabilities of private individuals");
Waterman L. Williams, The Liability of Municipal Corporations for Torts 26 (1901)
(stating that "the maxim of respondeat superior applies to [municipal corporations] in
the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of private individuals").
175. Johnson v. Municipality No. One, 5 La. Ann. 100, 100 (1850); see also
Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491, 493 (1881).
It is well settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies as well to
public as private corporations. The difficulty of determining who are officers
and servants is much greater in the one case than in the other, but there is no
doubt at all as to the applicability of the rule to municipal corporations.
Id.
176. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 819 n.5 (relying on Owen, 445 U.S. at 644-50); Owen, 445
U.S. at 676-79 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. Owen, 445 U.S. at 644-48; id. at 676-77 & n.16 (Powell, J., dissenting); see infra
Part III.B.
178. Owen, 445 U.S. at 648-50; id. at 677-78 (Powell, J., dissenting); see infra Part
III.B.
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viewed from a nineteenth-century perspective, neither of these two
distinctions undermines Justice Stevens's argument that the Forty-
Second Congress would have expected the ordinary rules of
respondeat superior to apply to cities. The discretionary-ministerial
distinction was utterly irrelevant to the respondeat superior
question.179  The governmental-proprietary distinction was an
application of the normal rules of respondeat superior, not an
exception to those rules. 180 Thus, Justice Rehnquist's "complicated
municipal tort immunities" cannot bear the weight he places on them.
Each of the distinctions will be discussed below.
A. The Discretionary-Ministerial Distinction
Nineteenth-century courts sometimes held that cities were exempt
from common law tort negligence liability for their officers'
"discretionary" (as opposed to "ministerial") decisions.18' Thus, a city
generally was not liable for damage to adjoining landowners resulting
from a city council's negligent decision to build a street in a particular
location, but was liable for city worker's negligent execution of that
decision. 182
However, this exemption was not a restriction on respondeat
superior liability but rather a state law allocation of power issue.
When a state delegates to city officials the discretion to decide an
issue, a jury should not be given authority to second guess the
reasonableness of that decision by finding the decision to be
negligent.183 The exemption is based not on a rejection of vicarious
liability but instead on the principle that it is improper to submit "to
the jury the ultimate determination of matters that the state has
179. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 188-96.
181. Discretionary functions were sometimes described as "judicial" or
"legislative." See, e.g., Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 3 N.Y. 463,466
(1850) (describing the functions as "judicial"); Wilson v. Mayor of New York, 1 Denio
595, 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) ("[I]f his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or
withheld, according to his own view of what is necessary and proper, they are in their
nature judicial."); 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 753, at 862 (describing the exemption as
covering "discretionary powers of a public or legislative character" and later using the
term "judicial"); Williams, supra note 174, § 66, at 103-04 (describing a city council's
discretionary decision whether and where to build streets as "legislative or judicial").
182. Compare Williams, supra note 174, § 63, at 96-97 (explaining that once a state
legislature gives city officials authority to lay out streets, "their decision is final, and
cannot properly at any subsequent time be submitted to a jury for revision"), and id. §
6, at 13-14 (explaining that discretionary decisions cannot be challenged on the basis
that they were negligent), with id. § 66, at 103 (explaining that if the construction work
is carried out in a negligent fashion by the city's employees, the city will be liable). See
also Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 358-59 (1877) (stating that a city generally is
not liable for a discretionary decision as to where to place sewers but may be liable for
negligent construction or maintenance of the sewers); Rochester White Lead Co. v.
City of Rochester, 3 N.Y. 463, 467 (1850) (same).
183. See infra notes 184-85.
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intrusted [sic] to the judgment and discretion of the municipal
authorities."'" The exemption was necessary to avoid "tak[ing] the
final determination of certain matters out of the hands of those to
whom the state committed it, and put[ting] it into the hands of a body
[the jury] which the state never intended should have it.' ' 85
As a result, the discretionary-ministerial distinction simply cannot
serve as a foundation for Moneil's rule eliminating municipal
respondeat superior liability for constitutional violations. As a
doctrine determining who-cities and their officials or judges and
juries-should determine whether certain decisions were reasonable,
it is utterly irrelevant to claims that those decisions violated
constitutional rights. "[A] municipality has no 'discretion' to violate
the Federal Constitution,' 8 6 and the state cannot delegate such
discretion to it. The discretionary function exemption could not
protect a municipality if its actions "are of such a character as to
constitute a positive invasion of those individual rights that the
Constitution guarantees. Legislative sanction cannot, in such cases
afford a protection to the corporation engaged in performing such acts
from the legal consequences of them." '187
In any event, applying the discretionary-ministerial distinction to §
1983 would turn Monell upside down. A formal decision by a city's
184. Williams, supra note 174, § 6, at 16; see also City of Little Rock v. Willis, 27
Ark. 572, 577 (1872) (making city liable for discretionary decisions would give
discretionary power to "the judiciary, instead of the City Council, where the
Legislature placed it"); Mills v. City of Brooklyn, 32 N.Y. 489, 495 (1865) (stating that
discretion that "the law has committed to the city council ... [should not] be exercised
by the judicial tribunals"); Carr v. N. Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 329 (1860) (recognizing
that when a town council is given discretion, a court should not "substitute the
judgment of a jury.., for that of the representatives of the town itself"). The doctrine
also exempted discretionary decisions from judicial interference by way of injunction
or mandamus. See, e.g., Platte & Denver Canal & Milling Co. v. Lee, 29 P. 1036, 1039
(Colo. 1892) (recognizing that injunctions should not issue to restrain discretionary
decisions of a municipality but holding that the doctrine did not apply where the
discretionary decision violated "vested rights"); 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 753, at 862-
63 (mandamus).
185. Williams, supra note 174, § 6, at 16; see also, e.g., Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648-50 (1980) (citing authorities); 1 Charles Fisk Beach,
Commentaries on the Law of Public Corporations 265 (1893) (permitting suits for
discretionary decisions would "transfer to court and jury the discretion which the law
vests in the municipality").
186. Owen, 445 U.S. at 649.
187. Williams, supra note 174, § 67, at 104 (emphasis added) (discussing cases in
which decisions to build or grade streets amount to the taking of adjoining owner's
property); see also, e.g., Platte, 29 P. at 1039 (recognizing that discretionary function
exemption does not apply when the city's action would violate "vested rights"); Keogh
v. Mayor of Wilmington, 4 Del. Ch. 491, 500 (1872) (recognizing that the judiciary
may interfere with a city's discretionary decisions when they would violate private
rights). This was simply one application of the more general rule that the
discretionary function exemption could not shield a city when it violated an absolute
duty. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 174, § 8, at 19-20 (stating that municipalities are
liable for noncompliance with statutes to the same extent as any legal individual).
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lawmakers is the quintessential example of city policy for which a city
is liable under Monell, while it is the quintessential example of a
discretionary decision for which a city is exempt under the
discretionary-ministerial distinction. On the other hand, wrongful
conduct by low-level city employees was likely to be considered
ministerial action for which a city would be liable, while it is also the
type of non-policy-executing conduct for which a city is exempt under
Monell. If the discretionary decision exemption were exported into §
1983, cities would become exempt for actions that implement or
execute official policy and liable for those that do not-the polar
opposite of the result reached in Monell.
B. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
Unlike the exemption for discretionary decisions, the doctrine that
later became known as the governmental-proprietary distinction did
deal with respondeat superior. In fact, it dealt exclusively with
respondeat superior.188 However, the governmental-proprietary
distinction was seen, not as creating an exception to respondeat
superior, but rather as a logical corollary of one of that doctrine's
central principles: A defendant could not be liable under respondeat
superior unless the tortfeasor was that defendant's servant or agent. i 9
188. Despite its name, the nineteenth-century "governmental-proprietary"
distinction was not based on whether a particular function had historically been
provided primarily by city governments. Murray Seasongood, Municipal
Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev.
469, 473 (1984). Firefighting, for example, was considered "governmental" even
though it had been performed almost exclusively by private volunteer companies until
the middle of the nineteenth century. Fred S. McChesney, Government Prohibitions
on Volunteer Fire Fighting in Nineteenth-Century America: A Property Rights
Perspective, 15 J. Legal Stud. 69, 72-78 (1986). Cincinnati created the first paid
municipal fire department in 1853 and some major cities such as Philadelphia
continued to rely on volunteer clubs as late as 1870. Id. at 78. As the debate on the
Sherman Amendment makes clear, municipal police departments were a recent
development in 1871 and were far from universal. The first municipal police
department was founded in London in 1829 and New York City's was not founded
until the 1840s. Yet police officers were considered "governmental." While the
Northwest Ordinance had mandated public education in the old northwest, free public
education was relatively new and far from universal, particularly in the South before
the Civil War. Nor were "governmental" functions limited to functions that involved
"governing" in the ordinary sense of "ruling" or "asserting sovereign control." Police
officers and jailers might be thought of as "governmental" in the ordinary sense; but
firefighters, school maintenance workers, garbage collectors, and surveyors are not.
Yet all were considered to perform "governmental" functions in the nineteenth
century.
189. 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 772, at 884. This understanding of the
governmental-proprietary distinction continued to be discussed well into the early
twentieth century. See, e.g., Jacob Aks, Note, Municipal Corporations: Tort Liability:
Ultra Vires: Governmental and Corporate Functions, 14 Cornell L.Q. 351, 352 n.2
(1929) (recognizing that when performing governmental functions, the employee "is
said to be the agent of the state, even though appointed and paid by the
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As the era's leading treatise on municipal law explained: "[W]hen it is
sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants
or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents
of the corporation."190 To apply this principle, courts needed to
determine whether a particular tortfeasor should be treated as the
city's agent or instead as a "public officer" - a phrase that, in
nineteenth-century parlance, referred to an agent of the state itself. 9 '
In making this sometimes difficult determination, courts utilized the
same rationales that justified respondeat superior itself, asking
whether the city rather than the state had the power to control the
tortfeasor and whether the tortfeasor's work was performed for the
benefit of the city or rather, for the benefit of the public (that is, the
state) as a whole. 192
The governmental-proprietary distinction was also derived from
another traditional respondeat superior principle. In the nineteenth
century, as now, respondeat superior made masters liable for the torts
of their servants but did not make supervisors (or persons in similar
positions) liable for the torts of their subordinates; and this was true
even if the supervisor was delegated the authority to select the
subordinate employees. 193 In suits against cities and officials, this
municipality"). However, it was increasingly seen as a legal fiction and rejected. See,
e.g., Evans v. Berry, 186 N.E. 203, 206-07 (N.Y. 1933).
190. 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 772, at 884; see also Williams, supra note 174, § 11,
at 26.
191. In the nineteenth century, the phrase "public officer" or "independent public
officer" was used to refer to state agents and was used to contrast such officials with
municipal employees. See, e.g., Maxmilian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N.Y. 160, 169
(1875) (holding that city health commissioners "are not to be regarded as servants or
agents of the [city], for whose acts or negligences [sic] it is liable, but as public or State
officers"); City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 100 (1854) (using the phrase "public
officer or agent of the state" as synonyms); 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 772, at 885
(contrasting "public or state officers" on the one hand with "servants or agents of the
[municipal] corporation); Leroy Parker & Robert H. Worthington, The Law of Public
Health and Safety, and the Powers and Duties of Boards of Health 177 (1892) (stating
that employees performing governmental functions are "not to be regarded as
servants or agents of the [municipal] corporation, for whose acts or negligence it is
impliedly liable, but as public or State officers"); 1 Thomas G. Shearman & Amasa A.
Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence § 253, at 469 (5th ed. 1898)
(recognizing that employees performing public functions are "not agents of the
[municipal] corporation, but of 'the greater public,' the state.").
192. 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 772, at 884-85.
193. 2 Story, supra note 78, § 313 (acknowledging that a supervisory agent is not
liable for the torts of those he hires for his principal; a supervisory servant is not liable
for acts of laborers he hires for his master); Delmar W. Doddridge, Distinction
Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23
Mich. L. Rev. 325, 334 (1925) (explaining that the state-not the city-is the real
principal even if city appoints the servant); see also Cardot v. Barney, 63 N.Y. 281, 290
(1875). The court in Cardot stated that:
The defendant and the superintendent, by whose fault the death of the
testator was caused, were in the same employ, both acting by the same
authority; and the fact that the latter was subordinate to the former by no
means makes him responsible for his acts; the superintendent or other
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principle led to what was then known as the public officer doctrine:
the doctrine that "public officers"-which included cities when
serving the function of public officers 94 -were not liable for the torts
of those persons that they were required to employ in order to
perform their duties to their employer, that is, the state."' Because
"public officers" and their subordinates were co-servants of the
state-although of different rank-neither was the other's master and
neither was liable for the other's torts.
1 96
Thus, nineteenth-century decisions rejecting municipal liability for
the acts of persons performing governmental functions did not, as one
plaintiff's attorney argued, cause the "doctrine of respondeat superior
[to be] annihilated. '" 197  Instead, as the court responded, those
decisions enforced the rationales on which respondeat superior was
founded by limiting liability to those who expect "to derive advantage
from an act which is done by another for him" and to those who have
the power to control the wrongdoer. 198
Bailey v. Mayor of New York,199 the decision that Justice Powell
(and, by extension, Justice Rehnquist) described as the leading case
general agent of a railroad, who by authority of the corporation employs and
discharges the subordinates, is not the master so as to be made responsible
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Id.
194. Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (holding
that when a city is acting solely on behalf of the state, it would be treated as a public
officer); City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 100 (1854) (stating that, when purely
public duties are "devolved upon the [city] as a public officer or agent of the State...
[the city] is only liable for [its] own misconduct"); Doddridge, supra note 193, at 334
(stating that muncipal lack of respondeat superior liability for governmental functions
is based on the idea that "the real superior is the State and not the municipality").
195. Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1888) (holding that public officers
are not responsible for torts of subagents); Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474, 474-
75 (1872) (stating that various ranks of postal officials are all public officers and
therefore are not liable for each others' torts even those of tortfeasors they appoint or
direct); Brown v. West, 76 A. 169, 169 (N.H. 1910) (holding that respondeat superior
is not applicable where defendant is public officer and tortfeasor is subagent); Cardot
63 N.Y. at 286 (stating the general rule and noting an English exception for sheriffs
who are considered the masters of their under-sheriffs because they derive profit
based on services performed rather than a fixed salary); 1 Shearman & Redfield,
supra note 191, § 319, at 553-54 (explaining that public officers not subject to
respondeat superior liability because the "sub-agents they are allowed or required to
appoint become, by such appointment, like themselves, agents of the government"
(emphasis added)); 2 Story, supra note 78, § 319 (public officers not liable for torts of
subagents); 2 id. § 319(a) (analogizing the non-liability of public officers for the torts
of subordinate officers to the similar non-liability of private agents for the torts of
their subagents).
196. Rothfeld, supra note 79, at 960.
197. Hickock v. Trs. of the Vill. of Plattsburgh, 15 Barb. 427, 441 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1853) (holding that a village is not liable for actions of trustees acting as road
commissioners because, in that capacity, they are not controlled by the village and do
not act for the village's benefit).
198. Id.
199. 3 Hill at 531.
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establishing the governmental-proprietary distinction, illustrates the
distinction's source in normal respondeat superior principles .2 ' The
New York City Water Commissioners had constructed a dam which
subsequently broke, damaging the plaintiffs' property. The
defendants211 made two arguments, both based on traditional
respondeat superior principles. First, they argued that, because the
city did not appoint or control the water commissioners, they were not
city employees, and therefore that the city was not liable for their
negligence. 22  The defendants supported this argument by pointing
out that the commissioners were appointed by the state, were
answerable only to the state, and could be removed by the state.20 3
Second, they argued that, even if the water commissioners were the
defendants' agents, the defendants should be treated as public
officers,2° that is, as servants of the state who, like other intermediate
servants, were not liable for the torts of their subagents. 2°
200. The two Bailey opinions, id., affd, 2 Denio 433 (N.Y. 1845), were regularly
cited as examples of the judicial effort to determine whether a particular tortfeasor
was properly considered an employee of the city for respondeat superior purposes.
See, e.g., 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 772, at 885 n.1 (contrasting Bailey with Russell v.
Mayor of New York, 2 Denio 461, 473, 481 (N.Y. 1845) in which the court held that
the city was not liable for the decision of the mayor and aldermen to destroy a
building to prevent the spread of fire, since they were acting, not as agents of the city,
but rather as agents of the state); Williams, supra note 174, § 11, at 26 n.2 (citing the
two cases as examples of the difficulty in determining whether the tortfeasor was a
municipal employee for purposes of respondeat superior). Other cases that Justice
Powell cites as examples of the governmental-proprietary distinction similarly
demonstrate that the distinction was a corollary derived from normal respondeat
superior principles. Child v. City of Boston, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 41, 51-52 (1862)
(holding that a city is not responsible for an aldermen's decisions as to the building of
sewers because, in making those decisions, aldermen do not act as agents of the city
but as agents of the state; but once the sewer has been built, the city selects and
controls the persons who maintain the sewers and therefore is responsible for their
negligence); W. Coll. of Homeopathic Med. v. City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375, 379
(1861) (noting the distinction between acts done by local officials "as officers of the
state, though elected by the people of the county," for which the county is not liable,
and acts done by those officials when acting as officers of the county).
201. The nominal defendants in the case were the mayor and various other officers
of the city, and the opinion consistently referred to them in the plural. However, the
suit was recognized to be, in effect, a suit against the municipal corporation itself.
Bailey, 3 Hill at 531 (headnote by reporter: "action against the corporation of the city
of New-York"); id. at 535-36 (argument of counsel, referring to the defendants as "a
corporation aggregate" and the "corporation of the city of New-York" and "a political
corporation"); id. at 539 (referring to the defendants as "a municipal or public body"
and "one of these public corporations").
202. Id. at 538 ("In other words, the commissioners not being [the City's] agents in
the construction of the dam, the rule respondeat superior could not properly be
applied.").
203. Id. at 543.
204. Id. at 538.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
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The court rejected these arguments on two traditional respondeat
superior bases: 206 reciprocity and control. First, it reasoned that the
commissioners were properly treated as city agents since their work
was performed for the benefit of the city rather than the state or
general public.207  This reasoning is a direct expression of the
reciprocity rationale,08 which emphasizes that respondeat superior is
"bottomed on this principle, that he who expects to derive advantage
from an act which is done by another for him, must answer for any
injury which a third person may sustain from it."'209 Second, the court
found that the city-not the state-was the master who actually
controlled the commissioners since the city had the authority to
decide whether they should perform any work, the power to accept or
reject the commissioner's proposed plans, and the authority to instruct
the commissioners whether to proceed with the construction. 210 This
finding is an application of the control rationale211 under which
respondeat superior "responsibility is placed where the power [to
control] exists. 212
Thus, the Bailey court employed normal respondeat superior
principles to determine whether the water commissioners were the
city's agents, and then, having found that they were, used normal
respondeat superior principles to hold the city liable for its agents'
negligence. The governmental-proprietary distinction recognized by
Bailey was not an exception to, or a limitation of, respondeat superior;
it was an application of it.
Bailey was only one of innumerable nineteenth-century cases
treating the governmental-proprietary distinction as the logical result
of core respondeat superior principles. When deciding whether a city
escaped liability because a particular tortfeasor was a "public officer"
performing a "governmental" or "public" function (rather than a city
"agent" performing a "proprietary" one) courts regularly relied on
the fact that a city lacked the authority to direct and control a
206. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the commissioners
could not be the city's agents since they had been appointed by the state. The court
reasoned that the city had adopted the commissioners as its agents by accepting the
charter under which they were appointed, by affirmatively approving their planned
work, and by directing them to proceed with it. Bailey, 3 Hill at 543-44; cf. Van
Valkenburgh v. Mayor &c. of New York, 43 Barb. 109, 115 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1864)
(holding that a different set of commissioners, also appointed by the state, were not
the city's agents since the city had not adopted them as such).
207. Bailey, 3 Hill at 539 (stating that work is made for "the private emolument and
advantage of the city").
208. See supra Part II.A.4.
209. Hall v. Smith, 130 Eng. Rep. 265,267 (C.P. 1824).
210. Bailey, 3 Hill at 543-44.
211. See supra Part II.A.2.
212. Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469,489 (1857).
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particular tortfeasor (the control rationale) 213 or the fact that the
tortfeasor's work was performed for the benefit of the public rather
than the city (the reciprocity rationale).214 Similarly, courts used the
reciprocity rationale to decide whether a city itself should be treated
as a quasi-public officer, that is, an agent of the state who would not
be liable for the torts of its co-agents or subagents.1 5 When these
decisions rejected respondeat superior liability, they did so-not
because the municipality was subject to different rules-but rather
because, under the normal rules, the municipality was not properly
treated as the tortfeasor's master.
Applying the normal respondeat superior rules led to results that
seem counterintuitive to a twenty-first-century reader. Police officers
were not considered city employees even though chosen, appointed,
and paid by the city, 216 and this was true even if they were enforcing a
213. Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87, 94 (1870) (finding that firefighters are
public officers rather than servants of the city because the city has no control over
them); Walcott v. Inhabitants of Swampscott, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 101, 102 (1861)
(finding that a surveyor of highways is not an agent of the town that elects him
because the town has no control over him); Ham v. Mayor of New York, 70 N.Y. 459,
462-63 (1877) (finding New York City Department of Education employees to be
"public or state officers" rather than city employees because the city could not
control, direct, or discharge them); Maxmilian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N.Y. 160,
169 (1875) (finding New York Department of Health employees to be "public
officers" because they are not controlled by the city); City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio
St. 80, 95 (1854) (finding that an engineer was a servant of the city rather than a public
officer because he acted under the city's commands).
214. Fisher, 104 Mass. at 93-94 (finding firefighters to be public officers rather than
servants of the city because their work is performed for the good of the public rather
than the city); Barney v. City of Lowell, 98 Mass. 570, 571-72 (1868) (same as to city's
superintendent of streets); Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 172, 173-74
(1861) (same as to city police officers); Walcott, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) at 102 (same as to
town's surveyor of highways); Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 82 Mass. (16 Gray)
297, 298 n.*, 302 (1860) (same even if firefighter is appointed by and paid by the city);
Maxmilian, 62 N.Y. at 169 (finding New York Department of Health commissioners
to be "public officers" because they are performing work for the benefit of the public'
as a whole).
215. Culver v. City of Streator, 22 N.E. 810, 811 (Ill. 1889) (finding that police
officers are not agents of the city and the city is not liable for their torts because "the
city acts only as the agent of the state"); Pease, 4 Ohio St. at 99-100 (holding that a city
is treated as a public officer when it is performing a purely public purpose).
216. See, e.g., Cook v. Mayor of Macon, 54 Ga. 468, 468-69 (1875) (finding that a
police officer is an agent of the state even though appointed by the city); Calwell v.
City of Boone, 2 N.W. 614, 615 (Iowa 1879) ("Police officers can in no sense be
regarded as agents or servants of the city."); Buttrick, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) at 173
(same); Pollock's Adm'r v. Louisville, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 221, 224-25 (1877) (finding
that police officers are not officers of the city but of the commonwealth); 1 Dillon,
supra note 120, § 34, at 146 n.1 ("[C]ases concur in holding that police officers are, in
fact, state officers, and not municipal, although a particular city or town be taxed to
pay them."); 2 id. § 773, at 886 ("[P]olice officers appointed by a city are not its agents
or servants."); 1 Platt Potter, Treatise on the Law of Corporations: General and
Local, Public and Private, Aggregate and Sole 481-82 (1879) (recognizing that a police
officer is an agent of the state even though appointed by the city); 2 Seymour
Thompson, The Law of Negligence in Relations Not Resting in Contract 737 (1880)
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city ordinance. 17 Firefighters were not considered city employees
even if selected by the city's mayor or alderman and even if the fire
department's expenses were paid by the city.218 Persons running a
city's jail or workhouse were not considered agents of the city,219 nor
were employees of a city's department of education.2  In fact, a
broad range of persons that twenty-first-century readers would think
of as city employees-and a substantial proportion of the likely
targets of suits under § 1983-were treated as servants of the state
rather than the city.
IV. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMMON LAW AND THE TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY ARGUMENT OVER MONELL
Thus, lawyers arguing that the Monell doctrine should be
overturned and those arguing that it should be reaffirmed will face a
common law background that can be summarized by the following
four propositions:
First, nineteenth-century judges and lawyers believed that the
doctrine of respondeat superior was based on four rationales: legal
unity, control, warranty, and reciprocity. These rationales both
justified the doctrine and defined its limits. While these rationales
(stating that because a police officer is not a servant of the city, the city has no liability
for the officer's torts); Williams, supra note 174, § 19, at 38 ("They cannot be
considered in any sense as the servants or agents of the [municipal] corporation.").
217. Buttrick, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) at 173.
218. 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 774, at 887-88; 1 Potter, supra note 216, at 482;
Williams, supra note 174, § 22, at 43-44; see also Fisher, 104 Mass. at 93-94 (holding
that firefighters are not servants or agents of the city since the city does not control
them and their work benefits the public as a whole); Hafford, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) at
298, 302 (same even if firefighter is appointed by and paid by the city); Workman v.
New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 585 (1900) (Gray, J., dissenting) (stating that a fire
department is established not just to protect the buildings within a city but also to
prevent fires from spreading to buildings outside the city limits). For an explanation
of why firefighting was seen as a function that was for the benefit of the entire state as
opposed to just the city or its citizens, see Jewett v. City of New Haven, 38 Conn. 368,
373-74 (1871) (describing the nationwide effects of a "recent terrible conflagration in
a western city" (presumably the great Chicago fire)). Some have claimed that the
Great New York Fire of 1835 caused a Wall Street panic and a national depression.
See McChesney, supra note 188, at 71 & n.6. For a brief description of some of the
more damaging American fires of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, see
id. at 71-72.
219. 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 260a, at 485; Williams, supra note
174, § 20, at 41; see also Curran v. City of Boston, 24 N.E. 781, 781-82 (Mass. 1890)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument that, because the city had voluntarily established the
municipal workhouse, its employees were agents of the city ).
220. Ham v. Mayor of New York, 70 N.Y 459, 462-63 (1877) (finding that
employees of the city's department of instruction were not city employees even
though the department had been made a branch of the city government); Reynolds v.
Bd. of Educ., 53 N.Y.S. 75, 77-78 (App. Div. 1898) (finding that an attendance officer
is not a school board employee even though selected by the board; based on the
control rationale); see also Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 49 N.E. 536, 537 (Ill. 1898)
(finding that employees building city school are state, not city, employees).
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were powerful arguments in favor of municipal respondeat superior,
they were equally powerful arguments against adopting the type of
liability contemplated by the Sherman Amendment. As a result, the
Monell Court was simply wrong to believe that members of Congress
who opposed the Sherman Amendment were likely to also oppose
municipal respondeat superior.
Second, nineteenth-century judges and lawyers believed that
respondeat superior applied to cities in the same way that it applied to
other corporations. However, like any other employer, cities were
only liable for the acts of their own employees. In deciding whether a
particular person was the city's employee, nineteenth-century courts
looked to the same four rationales that justified the doctrine's
existence, particularly the control and reciprocity rationales.
Third, as a result, public servants who were seen as not being
controlled by the city or who performed functions that were seen as
primarily benefiting the state or its citizens as a whole ("governmental
functions") were treated as servants of the state ("public officers")
rather than servants of the city. Because they were not the city's
employees, the city had no respondeat superior liability for their
wrongs. This was not seen as an exception to the rule of respondeat
superior but rather as a faithful application of the rule in light of its
rationales.
Fourth, as a result of this "governmental-proprietary" distinction,
cities avoided respondeat superior liability for the actions of a broad
range of persons that a twenty-first-century lawyer or judge would
consider to be city employees, including many who are frequent and
logical targets of § 1983 actions.
Any historically sound argument must be consistent with these
propositions. As a result, the lawyers supporting the Monell doctrine
will not be able to rely on Monel's own historical arguments against
respondeat superior since those arguments are fatally flawed. Instead,
they should urge the Court to treat nineteenth-century common law
decisions as the enacting Congress's background understanding, a set
of rules that are presumptively incorporated into § 1983. Initially,
they may be tempted to urge the Court to import the governmental-
proprietary distinction into contemporary § 1983 jurisprudence.
However, any effort to do so will face conceptual and practical
difficulties, not the least of which is that either argument would
logically lead to standards for municipal liability that would be utterly
inconsistent with the Monell doctrine. To deal with these difficulties,
they will need to delve even further into substantive nineteenth-
century common law and argue that the Court should rely on a now-
little-known line of cases defining the liability of "public officers" for
the torts of their subordinates. Those decisions rejected respondeat
superior and at the same time prefigured the Monell doctrine's four
limited routes to municipal liability and its requirement of action by
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an official policymaker. Those arguments and that body of case law
are discussed in Part IV.A.
Lawyers opposing Monell will attack the underlying foundation of
this argument: the assumption that the enacting Congress would have
expected future courts to incorporate nineteenth-century common law
rules. They will argue that Congress would have expected the Court
to treat the common law as nineteenth-century lawyers and judges
saw it: not as a set of immutable, specific rules, but instead as a
flexible decision-making process in which unchanging general
principles-in this case, the fundamental rationales for respondeat
superior-are applied to changing societal conditions to produce rules
that vary from place to place and change as society itself changes.
They will then argue that applying that process ineluctably leads to
rejection of the underlying basis of both the governmental-proprietary
distinction and Monell's supporters' argument: the fiction that a
broad range of city-paid workers are really state rather than city
employees. Those arguments are discussed in Part IV.B.
A. Focusing on Common Law Rules: Using Nineteenth-Century
Public Officer Liability Theory to Support Monell
Lawyers urging the Court to reaffirm the Monell doctrine may be
tempted to adopt a seductively simple position: Because Congress
was presumptively familiar with the common law, 1 the nineteenth-
century governmental-proprietary distinction should be imported
bodily into contemporary § 1983 jurisprudence, making cities liable on
a respondeat superior basis for proprietary functions and freeing them
entirely from liability for governmental functions.222 However, for two
reasons, this argument is unlikely to be successful. First, throughout
the twentieth century, the governmental-proprietary distinction was
221. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (assuming
that because the Forty-Second Congress was familiar with existing common law
principles, it intended those principles to apply absent evidence to the contrary);
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1983) (same); City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) (same).
222. For the reasons set forth in Part II, Monell's supporters will not be able to rely
on Monell's own historical arguments. At the same time, the well-known existence of
the governmental-proprietary distinction would make it unprofitable for Monell's
opponents to adopt Justice Stevens's argument for simple incorporation of nineteenth-
century common law. If late nineteenth-century common law fully and immutably
defined the scope of § 1983 respondeat superior liability, then local governmental
entities would not be liable for constitutional violations by police officers, teachers,
firefighters, jail guards, or any other employee who would then have been treated as
performing a "governmental function" and thus as an employee of the state rather
than the city. See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 170, at 766-67 n.51 (arguing that
incorporation of nineteenth-century common law would require incorporation of the
governmental-proprietary distinction and would eliminate liability for most § 1983
claims); see also Kramer & Sykes, supra note 135, at 262-63 (same and claiming that it
might justify something similar to the Monell doctrine).
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so widely criticized,223 and so uniformly abrogated,224 that it is hard to
imagine a twenty-first-century Supreme Court attempting to revive
it. 1  Second, importing the distinction would create a dichotomy
unknown to Monell, and would eliminate Monell's own distinction
between actions that execute official policy and those that do not. As
223. See, e.g., Seasongood, supra note 188, at 473; Charles W. Tooke, The Extension
of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev. 97, 102-03 (1932) (describing the
distinction as leading to decisions that are "absurd [and] indefensibly unjust"); see also
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (finding the
governmental-proprietary distinction unworkable).
224. See, e.g., Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 231 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (Ind. 1967)
(citing numerous states); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 227 n.1
(Mo. 1977) (en banc) (stating that twenty-nine states had abolished governmental
immunities); Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 58, § 895C (stating that the
distinction has been rejected by numerous jurisdictions); 1 Civil Actions Against State
and Local Government § 1:8 (WestLaw ed., 2004) (listing thirty states as having
abolished cities' governmental immunity); Joe R. Greenhill & Thomas V. Murto III,
Governmental Immunity, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 462, 464-65, 465 n.27 (1971) (citing
numerous cases).
225. The broad rejection of the governmental-proprietary distinction might tempt
Monell's opponents to argue that the Court should incorporate contemporary rather
than nineteenth-century common law. It is true that the Court has at times suggested
that it is appropriate to apply "the common law of torts (both modern and as of 1871)"
as a guide to the meaning of § 1983, stating that it would not "assume that Congress
intended to perpetuate a now-obsolete doctrine." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 &
n.2 (1983) (emphasis added); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-22, 422
n.19 (1976) (incorporating an immunity that the Court acknowledged had not existed
until twenty-five years after § 1983 was enacted and did not become the majority rule
until even later); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (relying on the twentieth-
century "prevailing view" to justify incorporating a form of qualified immunity for
police officers). See generally Achtenberg, supra note 69, at 524-28. Lawyers seeking
to overturn Monell could argue that municipalities are currently subject to respondeat
superior liability for the non-constitutional torts of their employees, that the
governmental-proprietary distinction is a "now-obsolete doctrine" that has been
rejected by a majority of the states, and therefore that municipal respondeat
superior- unqualified by the governmental-proprietary distinction -should be
applied under § 1983. But this "dynamic incorporation" argument is historically
flawed and practically unworkable. The Forty-Second Congress had grave doubts
that state courts would adequately protect individual rights and was highly unlikely to
have intended to let state court decisions define and limit the extent to which § 1983
would protect those rights. Id. at 527-28 & nn.227-30; id. at 533 & nn.273-74; see also
David Achtenberg, With Malice Toward Some: United States v. Kirby, Malicious
Prosecution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 Rutgers L.J. 273, 298-303 (1995)
(describing post-war Confederate control of the Kentucky judicial system and the use
of that system to harass freedmen and Union sympathizers). In any event, there
simply is no unitary body of modern law for the present Court to incorporate.
Contemporary state law on the tort liability of cities is a hodgepodge that varies
drastically from state to state. While most states have abolished the governmental-
proprietary distinction, others have not, and some have fully or partially reinstated it.
Compare supra note 224 (listing cases that have abolished the distinction), with 19
McQuillin, supra note 148, § 53.02.10 n.40 (citing cases that have reinstated it in full or
part), and Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.600 (West 2000) (reinstating governmental immunity
subject to the governmental-proprietary distinction and subject to new exceptions).
The dynamic incorporation approach provides no basis for choosing which "modern
common law" to choose.
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a practical matter, it is simply inconceivable that the current Court
would adopt a standard that would make a city liable for a public
utility worker's discriminatory treatment of a customer even though
that treatment clearly violated city policy, while making the city
exempt from liability for a police officer's discriminatory treatment of
a suspect even though city ordinances explicitly dictated that
treatment.
Instead, Monell supporters may want to argue that the exemption
for governmental functions covered such a broad range of crucial
municipal employees2 26 that it should be treated as the practical
equivalent of an across-the-board municipal immunity for the actions
of all employees. But this approach faces serious practical obstacles.
It would require the Supreme Court not only to revive the widely
reviled governmental-proprietary distinction but also to expand it. In
addition, while it would support Monell's rejection of respondeat
superior, it would also seem to overrule Monell's primary holding-
that cities are not entirely exempt from § 1983 suits -and to eliminate
the four theories under which the Monell doctrine permits cities to be
sued. There is no reason to believe that five members of the Court
would be willing to take the drastic step of completely eliminating the
already highly limited situations in which cities can be held liable
under § 1983.227 To reaffirm Monell, its supporters need to provide an
historical basis for mitigating the harshness of that step. They must
identify a nineteenth-century line of cases that rejects municipal
respondeat superior yet preserves the Monell doctrine's four
alternative theories of municipal liability.
1. Nineteenth-Century Public Officer Theory
Monell's supporters should turn to a body of nineteenth-century
case law that provides striking parallels to the Monell doctrine: the
liability of public officers for the torts of their subordinates. As
discussed in Part III.B, the nineteenth-century governmental-
proprietary distinction treated certain city-paid workers as employees
of the state rather than employees of the city even though the city had
selected them and had considerable supervisory power over them. In
those situations, it treated the city itself as a public officer (that is, as a
226. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
227. There may be three Justices who would. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented
from Monell's overruling of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and has hinted that
he would be willing to return to the Monroe regime. Justices Scalia and Thomas have
both indicated that they believe that even Monroe unjustifiably expanded the scope of
§ 1983. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611-12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Replacement of two of the more liberal members of the current Court with
substantially more conservative members might tip the balance. In that event, it
might be the plaintiffs' bar-rather than defense lawyers-who try to preserve the
Monell doctrine by making the arguments set forth in Parts IV.A.1-4.
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higher ranking agent of the state) who had been merely delegated the
authority to select and supervise the employees on the state's
behalf.228 As a public officer, the city was not responsible for its
subordinates' torts under respondeat superior because the city was
their supervisor rather than their employer.22 ' However, in the
nineteenth century, a public officer or other supervisor could be held
liable for a subordinate's wrongs under certain other theories and
these alternative theories of liability provide a striking parallel to the
Monell doctrine. 3° Moreover, in their efforts to apply public officer
liability theory to municipal corporations, late nineteenth-century
courts prefigured Monell's overarching requirement that municipal
liability be tied to action by municipal policymakers 31
2. Nineteenth-Century Theories of Public Officer Liability and
Monell's Four Routes
In the nineteenth century, public officers were generally not held
liable for the torts committed by subordinates chosen by them to assist
in the performance of their governmental functions since such
subordinates were seen as employees of the state rather than of the
officer. It was well-recognized that "[t]he rule of respondeat superior
does not apply to [public officers], because the subagents which they
are allowed or required to appoint become, by such appointment, like
themselves, agents of the government.2132  However, such public
officers could be held liable under three non-respondeat superior
theories that paralleled the Monell doctrine's four routes to municipal
liability. 33  First, public officers were liable if they "directed,
authorized, or co-operated in the wrong. "234 Second, they were liable
if they failed to properly supervise their subordinates' conduct.235
Third, public officers could be held liable if they failed to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of their subordinates. 36
The first of these theories roughly parallels Monell's formal policy
basis for municipal liability.237 Under Monell and its progeny, cities
228. See infra Part IV.A.3.
229. See infra Part IV.A.2.
230. See infra Part IV.A.2.
231. See infra Part IV.A.4.
232. 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 554; see also Wiggins v.
Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632, 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849) (holding that respondeat superior
does not apply to public officers because the officers and their subagents are both
agents of the government).
233. See supra Part I.A.
234. Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 790
(1890).
235. Id. § 791 (dealing with negligent oversight of the work); 1 Shearman &
Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553.
236. 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553; Mechem, supra note
234, § 791.
237. To a lesser extent, it parallels Monell's custom-based theory of municipal
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are liable for a city employee's unconstitutional action if that action
"implements or executes" policies formally adopted by the city's
lawmakers, that is, if the employee is doing what he or she has been
directed to do by the city itself.238 In the nineteenth century, a public
officer was similarly liable for the wrongful act of a subordinate if the
officer "directed or authorized the wrong." '239
In Woodcock v. City of Calais,2" this principle was applied to a city
serving as the functional equivalent of a public officer. The court
recognized that a city would ordinarily not be liable for the wrongs of
a city-paid surveyor because the surveyor should be treated as the
state's (rather than the city's) agent.241 The city was not made liable
even by the fact that the mayor and city attorney had ordered the
surveyor to commit the wrongful act because they were also state
agents for whose conduct the city was not responsible. 242 However,
when the surveyor was "expressly 'directed' by the city government"
by a "positive, formal vote" to commit the wrongful act, the surveyor
became the city's agent quo ad hoc (with respect to this act) and the
city became liable.243
The Monell doctrine's next theory of liability, inadequate training
or supervision, also had an analog in nineteenth-century public officer
law. Like a municipality under Monell, a nineteenth-century public
officer was liable for subordinates' wrongs if the officer failed to
adequately "superintend their conduct."' 2" And just as the Monell
doctrine requires a plaintiff to prove that the constitutional violation
was caused by the city's inadequate training or supervision,2 45 so
liability. Monell recognized that a city could be liable when the constitutional
violation was "visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom
has not received formal approval," so long as the custom was sufficiently well-
established that it had "the force of law." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978). Nineteenth-century authorities holding public officers to be liable if
they "authorized or cooperated in" their subordinates' wrongs may be read as
covering informal as well as formal authorization.
238. Id. at 690; see supra Part II.A.
239. Ely v. Parsons, 10 A. 499, 504 (Conn. 1886); see Castle v. Duryea, 32 Barb. 480,
486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1860) (holding officer liable for injury caused by subordinate's
act if he "issued the order in conformity with which the act was done"); Tracy v.
Cloyd, 10 W. Va. 19, 31 (1877) (stating that public officers are liable for subordinate's
wrongs if "they have directed the act to be done"); Mechem, supra note 234, § 790
(stating that officers are liable for a subordinate's conduct if they "directed,
authorized, or co-operated in the wrong"); 2 Story, supra note 78, § 321 (recognizing
that public officers are liable for subordinate's wrongs if they have "cooperated in or
authorized the wrong"); 2 id. § 386 (stating that officers are liable for a subordinate's
conduct if they "directed the act to be done or personally cooperated in the
negligence").
240. 66 Me. 234 (1877).
241. Id. at 235.
242. Id. at 236.
243. Id.
244. 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553.
245. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
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nineteenth-century courts required plaintiffs to prove that the harm
was the "consequence" of the public officer's inadequate
246supervision.
However, in an important respect, a nineteenth-century public
officer's liability for inadequate superintendence of his subordinates
differed from a contemporary city's liability under the Monell
doctrine's training/supervision-based theory: Public officers were
liable without a showing that the supervision was so lax as to
demonstrate "deliberate indifference. '247  Although differing in the
precise wording used, the nineteenth-century authorities seemed to
agree that a showing of simple negligent supervision was sufficient to
make the public officer liable.248  As one often-cited case stated, a
public officer was expected to exercise "that care and diligence [in
supervising subordinates] which every person of common prudence
and capable of governing a family takes of his own concerns." '249 Thus,
the nineteenth-century authorities imposed inadequate supervision
liability on public officers much more freely than Monell imposes it on
cities.
The Monell doctrine's final route to municipal liability, improper
hiring, also had a rough parallel in the law of public officer liability.
Nineteenth-century public officers could be held liable if they
"negligently or willfully employ[ed] or retain[ed] improper
persons. 25 0  Most authorities predicated this liability on mere
246. Dunlop v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 242, 269 (1812); see also Ford v. Parker,
4 Ohio St. 576, 582 (1855) (holding that jury must decide whether the public officer's
negligent operation of his office "was, or was not, the cause" of the harm to plaintiff).
247. Compare Harris, 489 U.S. at 388 (requiring deliberate indifference), with
sources cited infra note 248 (basing liability on negligence).
248. Dunlop, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 269 ("[H]is own neglect in not properly
superintending [his subordinates]"); Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 Watts 453, 457 (Pa. 1839)
(recognizing failure to exercise "reasonable care and diligence" in superintending
subordinates); Mechem, supra note 234, § 790 ("[S]o carelessly or negligently
oversees, conducts, or carries on the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity
for the default."); 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553 (recognizing
failure to "exercise ordinary care" in supervising subordinates); 2 Story, supra note 78,
§ 319a ("[G]uilty of ordinary negligence at least.., in not exercising a reasonable
superintendence and vigilance over [subordinates'] acts and doings."); Annotation, Of
the Liability of a Principal for Injuries Done by His Agent, in the Course of His Duty
As Agent-Respondeat Superior, 1 Am. Leading Cases 619, 621 (1852) ("[N]eglect in
not properly superintending the discharge of [subordinates'] duties .....
249. Schroyer, 8 Watts at 455-56.
250. Mechem, supra note 234, § 790; see also Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 514
(1888) (stating that officers are not responsible for a subordinates' wrongs absent
evidence that the subordinates were incompetent or not properly selected); Cent.
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lampley, 76 Ala. 357, 365 (1884) (holding a public officer
liable if he, "from carelessness or unfaithfulness, appoints incompetent or
untrustworthy" subordinates); 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553
(stating that public officers are liable if they failed "to exercise ordinary care in
selecting proper persons"); 2 Story, supra note 78, § 319a (stating that public officers
are liable if they fail to exercise ordinary care "at least, in not selecting persons of
suitable skill"). There are examples of even more restrictive liability standards. See,
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negligence2 1 and thus provide no support for the Monell doctrine's
narrowing of hiring-based municipal liability to cases in which it was
plainly obvious that the applicant would commit misconduct and
"highly likely [that he would] inflict the particular injury suffered by
the plaintiff., 25 2 However, a few nineteenth-century authorities did
restrict such liability to cases in which the hiring decision was more
than simply negligent. Some suggested that inadequate hiring liability
would not attach unless the public officer actually knew that the
subordinate was incompetent or unfaithful,253 and unless it was
reasonable to infer that giving the job to the subordinate would be
likely to lead to disastrous or fatal consequences. 4  One authority
analogized public officer liability for retaining a known incompetent
subordinate to "the principle which implicates a male fide keeper of a
vicious animal in the mischief done by it. '255 Nevertheless, taken as a
whole, while nineteenth-century cases provided solid support for some
sort of hiring-based public officer liability, they provided only limited
e.g., Castle v. Duryea, 32 Barb. 480, 488-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1860) ("If the officer,
knowing the incompetency of his subordinates, purposely assigns to them a task, in
the execution of which it is reasonable to infer that negligence will occur and fatal
consequences ensue, he is or may be responsible for the injuries thus occasioned.");
Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632, 635-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849) (holding that an
officer is liable if "it can be proved that such deputies are notoriously unfit for the
station, and thus charge the defendant with negligence in making the appointment");
Schroyer, 8 Watts at 459 (Gibson, C.J., concurring) (holding that officer is liable for
subordinates' torts if he retained them after learning that they were unfaithful to their
responsibilities); 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553 (holding that
an officer is liable for assigning subordinates jobs "for which they know such
subordinates to be incompetent, and in the execution of which it is reasonable to infer
that disastrous consequences will ensue").
251. Lampley, 76 Ala. at 365 (finding liability if appointment of an incompetent
results "from carelessness or unfaithfulness"); Mechem, supra note 234, § 790
(recognizing liability for "negligently or willfully" selecting or retaining improper
persons); 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553 (acknowledging the
requirement of "ordinary care in selecting proper persons"); 2 Story, supra note 78, §
319a (recognizing the requirement of ordinary care at least in choosing subordinates).
252. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412 (1997). But see Brissac v.
Lawrence, 4 F. Cas. 153, 155 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 1888) (instructing the jury
that, even if the customs collector had hired an intemperate bookkeeper and that the
bookkeeper was drunk every day, the plaintiff still "must show that the [harm
resulted] from that particular cause").
253. See, e.g., Castle, 32 Barb. at 488-89 (stating that an officer may be liable if he
"know[s] the incompetency of his subordinates, [and still] purposely assigns to them a
task, in the execution of which it is reasonable to infer that negligence will occur");
Schroyer, 8 Watts at 459 (Gibson, C.J., concurring) (stating that an officer should be
liable for subordinates' torts if he retained them after "they had been found
unfaithful"); 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 319, at 553 (recognizing that
officers are liable for assigning subordinates jobs "for which they know such
subordinates to be incompetent"); see also Wiggins, 6 Barb. at 635-36 (stating that an
officer is liable if "it can be proved that such deputies are notoriously unfit for the
station, and thus charge the defendant with negligence in making the appointment").
254. Castle, 32 Barb. at 488-89 ("fatal consequences"); 1 Shearman & Redfield,
supra note 191, § 319, at 553 ("disastrous consequences").
255. Schroyer, 8 Watts at 459 (Gibson, C.J., concurring).
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and ambiguous support for restricting that liability to situations
demonstrating more than mere negligence.
In summary, to the extent nineteenth-century cities were treated as
public officers, they were not liable under respondeat superior. They
were liable if they authorized or directed the wrong, negligently
supervised the wrongdoer, or negligently hired the wrongdoer.
However, negligent supervision liability was clearly much broader
than the Monell doctrine's version of training/supervision-based
municipal liability. Similarly, nineteenth-century liability for
improper hiring was probably not as narrowly confined as hiring-
based liability under Monell and Brown. Thus, to the extent that
nineteenth-century lawyers thought of a municipal corporation as the
equivalent of a public officer, they may have expected courts to apply
a somewhat watered-down version of the Monell doctrine to suits
against cities under § 1983.
3. Nineteenth-Century Cities as Public Officers
It seems likely that, in cases involving governmental functions,
nineteenth-century lawyers would have considered cities to be the
legal equivalent of public officers. As discussed in Part III.B, the
governmental-proprietary distinction was founded on the idea that
employees performing so-called governmental functions were state
agents or, in nineteenth-century parlance, "public officers." '256 This
was true even if the city selected them, paid them, and supervised
them.257 But if the employees were servants of the state, what was the
functional legal status of the city that selected and supervised them?
While the question is not entirely free from doubt, it seems likely
that the city was itself considered to be a public officer-simply a
higher ranking one to whom the state had assigned the task of
selecting and supervising the subordinate employees on the state's
behalf. Nineteenth-century cases frequently explained that the power
to select such an employee was simply delegated to the city or town as
a convenient way for the state to exercise its own appointment
256. In the nineteenth century, the phrase "public officer" or "independent public
officer" was used to refer to state agents and was used to contrast such officials with
municipal employees. See, e.g., Maxmilian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N.Y. 160, 169
(1875) (stating that city health commissioners are "not to be regarded as servants or
agents of the [city], for whose acts or negligences [sic] it is liable, but as public or State
officers"); City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 100 (1854) (using the phrase "public
officer or agent of the state" as synonyms); 2 Dillon, supra note 120, § 772, at 884-85
(contrasting "public or state officers" on the one hand with "servants or agents of the
[municipal] corporation); 1 Shearman & Redfield, supra note 191, § 253, at 469
(stating that employees performing public functions are "not agents of the [municipal]
corporation, but of the 'greater public,' the state").
257. See supra note 216.
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power.25 s Similarly, when the city was given the power to control and
supervise such employees and to regulate their conduct, it was seen as
exercising that authority on the state's behalf.2 9 Logically speaking,
cities performing governmental functions were themselves state
agents, and numerous cases described them as such.260
As a result, when performing governmental functions, a city's
liability for its subordinates' wrongs was determined by the same rules
that were applicable to all public officers. Thus, in Bailey v. Mayor of
New York,6 the court stated that cities performing governmental
functions were "entitled to all the immunities of public officers";262 and
that therefore "the doctrine of respondeat superior [did] not apply to
[them in] such cases. 2 63  However, like other public officers, they
could be held liable for negligent hiring, for "want of diligence in the
258. See Buttrick v. Lowell, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 172, 173 (1861) (recognizing the
power to appoint police officers is "devolved on cities and towns by the legislature as
a convenient mode of exercising a function of the government"); see also Peters v.
City of Lindsborg, 20 P. 490, 491 (Kan. 1889) (same); Doty v. Village of Port Jervis, 52
N.Y.S. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1898) (same); Norristown Borough v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121, 125
(1880) (same); Burch v. Hardwicke, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 24, 36 (1878) (same); id. at 38
(stating that when a city selects employees to perform governmental functions, it does
so because the legislature has "delegate[d] its [appointment] authority to the
municipality"); cf. Walcott v. Swampscott, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 101, 102 (1861)
(acknowledging that the legislature delegated to towns and cities its power to select
surveyors because doing so was "deemed expedient").
259. Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334, 337 (1883) (stating that city control of
fire department employees is exercised on behalf of the state even if the state did not
compel the city to create the fire department); Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87,
94 (1870) (recognizing that when the city prescribes duties of particular firefighters, it
is exercising delegated state power); Ballentine v. Mayor and Alderman of Pulaski, 83
Tenn. 633, 643 (1885) (stating that towns act as "parts and agents of the State
government" when given control over public schools).
260. See Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1898)
(contrasting a city acting as "agent of the state" when employees performing
governmental functions and a city acting as "agent of its citizens" when employees are
performing proprietary functions); Iron Mountain Ry. Co. v. City of Memphis, 96 F.
113, 128 (6th Cir. 1899) (same); City of Chicago v. Seben, 46 N.E. 244, 246 (I11. 1897)
("[fIn the exercise of [governmental functions] the municipality is an agent of the
state,..."); Easterly v. Town of Irwin, 68 N.W. 919, 920 (Iowa 1896) (recognizing that
employees enforcing police power are not city employees even if appointed by the city
because "[i]n the matter of enforcing its police regulations the city acts as an agent of
the state"); Wade v. City of Mt. Sterling, 33 S.W. 1113, 1114 (Ky. 1896)
(acknowledging that a city's primary role is to "aid the state in its governmental
functions"); Givens v. City of Paris, 24 S.W. 974, 974 (Tex. 1893) (recognizing that
when a city exercises police power it acts as an "agent of the State" and representative
of the sovereign); Whitfield v. City of Paris, 19 S.W. 566, 567 (Tex. 1892) (same).
261. 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). Although the named defendants were the
"Mayor &c. of the City of New York" and the defendants were frequently referred to
in the plural, the actual defendant was the city itself. See supra note 201.
262. Bailey, 3 Hill at 538 (emphasis added).
263. Id.; see also City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 99-100 (1854) (stating that,
when purely public duties are "devolved upon the [city] as a public officer or agent of
the State, . . . [the city] only is liable for [its] own direct misconduct").
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selection of agents, ' 6 or for directing the agent to commit the
265 266wrong, or presumably for negligent supervision.
4. Nineteenth-Century Cities and Monell's "Official Policymaker"
Requirement
Because cities are entities rather than natural persons, applying
public officer liability to them raised the same dilemma created by
Monell itself: Because an entity can only act through agents of some
sort, courts must decide which agents' conduct will be considered the
conduct of the city itself. 67 Nineteenth-century cases seem to have
resolved that dilemma in a manner somewhat similar to the Monell
doctrine's limitation of liability to conduct by an official municipal
"policymaker."
For example, in Woodcock v. City of Calais,268 the court recognized
that a city would not ordinarily be liable for the wrongs of a city-paid
surveyor since the surveyor should be treated as an agent of the state,
rather than the city, but held the city liable because it had directed
that the wrongful act be done. However, the city was liable only
because its policymaking officials had formally ordered the surveyor
to do the wrongful act.269 Even the fact that the mayor and city
attorney had directed the surveyor to do so was not enough to make
the city liable since they (like the surveyor) were state agents for
whose conduct the city was not responsible.27 Instead, the city could
be held liable only because the surveyor had been "expressly
'directed' [to commit the wrongful act] by the city government" acting
through a "positive, formal vote.""27 Thus, like the Court in Monell,
the Woodcock court held the city liable only because the action was
taken pursuant to a decision that was "officially adopted 27 2 by the
city, that is, was made by "its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. 273
264. Bailey, 3 Hill at 538. But see O'Rourke v. City of Sioux Falls, 54 N.W. 1044,
1046-47 (S.D. 1893) (sustaining a demurrer to petition apparently claiming the city
was guilty of negligent hiring, but treating the petition as if it was based on respondeat
superior).
265. Woodcock v. City of Calais, 66 Me. 234, 236 (1877) (finding the city liable
when the city government directed the surveyor to commit the wrong).
266. See Kittredge v. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio Dec. 504 (Ohio C.P. 1904)
(holding that the city is not liable for regulating police officers because their control
was vested in an independent board rather than in the city itself).
267. For discussion of this dilemma, see, for example, Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights
Litigation After Monell, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 217-20 (1979); Rothfeld, supra note
79, at 940-41.
268. 66 Me. at 234.
269. Id. 236.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
273. Id. at 694.
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Similarly, in Doty v. Village of Port Jervis,274 the court suggested
that a city could not be held liable on a negligent hiring theory unless
l olicymaking officials were responsible for the hiring. The plaintiff's
wrongful death suit alleged that the village president had hired "an
incompetent, inefficient, negligent, and dangerous man, utterly unfit
and incompetent to fulfill the duties" of a police officer, and that the
village "had actual notice of his unfit and dangerous character." '75
However, the court held that the village could not be held liable since
the hiring had been performed by its executive officer (the president)
rather than the village itself (presumably acting through its board of
trustees). "The complaint asserts no negligence whatever on the part
of the defendant [village] as a corporation. The appointment of the
police officer was not its act, but the act of its president, over which it
possessed neither control nor supervision." '76 Thus, the Doty court
prefigured the Monell doctrine's official policymaker requirement by
refusing to hold the village liable for wrongful action of an executive
officer whose acts could not "fairly be said to represent official policy"
of the village itself.277
Thus, Monell's supporters can argue that nineteenth-century
common law decisions on public officer liability provide a solid
historical framework for the Monell doctrine. Those decisions
rejected respondeat superior and at the same time prefigured the
Monell doctrine's four limited routes to municipal liability as well as
its requirement of action by an official policymaker.
B. Focusing on the Common Law Process: Using the Nineteenth-
Century Rationales to Overturn Monell
That framework may, however, be built on a flawed foundation:
the assumption that the enacting Congress would have expected
future Supreme Courts to focus on common law decisions rather than
on the common law decision-making process. Nineteenth-century
lawyers and judges did not view the common law as an ironclad set of
immutable specific rules, unchanging over time and engraved in stone.
At the same time, they did not view common law decision making as
an unrestricted license for judges to implement their personal views of
the public good. Instead, they saw it as a method for applying a set of
unchanging general principles to specific situations to produce
concrete rules that would legitimately vary from place to place and
would properly change from time to time as the world itself changed.
274. 52 N.Y.S. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 59; cf Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483,16.12 (1986)
(stating that a city would not be responsible for the conduct of a sheriff wHo had final
authority to select deputies unless the sheriff also had final authority to set the criteria
for hiring).
277. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
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The lawyer-members of the Forty-Second Congress would most likely
have expected future federal courts to use this common law process to
determine the proper scope of municipal respondeat superior under §
1983. They would not have expected the courts to transplant
nineteenth-century rules of respondeat superior into a twenty-first-
century world, but would instead have expected the courts to apply
the fundamental principles behind respondeat superior to the realities
of twenty-first-century municipal employee relationships. 78 That
process provides a powerful argument that Monell should be
overruled and municipal respondeat superior restored.
1. The Common Law Process: Applying Unchanging Principles to a
Changing Society
Nineteenth-century lawyers and judges understood and admired the
flexibility of the common law.279 They saw flexibility as "[t]he great
excellence of the common law, ' 280 as its "peculiar boast,, 281' and as its
"chief attribute. ' ,2' They recognized that this flexibility made it
possible for common law rules to vary to accommodate variations in
geographic or demographic conditions283 and to change to adapt to
changes in society.28
278. The common law process is not simply another version of the dynamic
incorporation approach. See supra note 225. Dynamic incorporation would require
the Court to examine an external source-existing state and federal common law
decisions on municipal respondeat superior in ordinary tort cases-and to adopt the
result of that examination as the scope of respondeat superior for § 1983. The
common law process requires the Court to itself examine the rationales behind
respondeat superior and to decide what scope was best justified by those rationales. It
is the difference between setting a local bank's prime interest rate by simply adopting
CitiBank's published rate and setting it by having the bank officers independently
review designated economic factors. The two approaches may lead to the same result,
but they do so through different thought processes.
279. See, e.g., Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587, 628 (N.Y. 1825)
(expressing admiration for the flexibility of the common law).
280. Johnson v. Baird, 3 Blackf. 182, 189 (Ind. 1833); see also Burton v. Curyea, 40
Ill. 320, 326 (1866) (describing adaptability as one of the common law's
"excellencies"); John Norton Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil
Code, 4 W. Coast Rep. 1, 110 (1884) ("The distinguishing element of the common law,
and one of its highest excellencies, is its elasticity, its power of natural growth and
orderly expansion.").
281. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884); see also Norway Plains Co. v.
Boston and Me. R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267 (1854) (describing adaptability as
"one of the great merits and advantages of the common law").
282. Utermehle v. McGreal, 1 App. D.C. 359, 368 (1893).
283. See, e.g., Boyer v. Sweet, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 120, 121 (1841) (noting that common
law rules vary from place to place because rules "suited to a highly refined and
luxurious people... may be very ill adapted to a community differently situated");
Ketelson v. Stilz, 111 N.E. 423, 424-25 (Ind. 1916) (stating that common law rules must
be modified due to local circumstances); Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. 9 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1858), rev'd on other grounds, 35 N.Y. 454 (1866) (same); People v. Randolph, 2 Park.
Crim. Rep. 174, 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (recognizing that common law rules vary
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However, while common law rules were changeable, the underlying
principles of the common law were not.285 As one often-cited case put
it, the much-admired flexibility of the common law did not lie "in the
change of great and essential principles, but in the application of old
principles, to new cases, and in the modification of the rules flowing
from them, to such cases as they arise: so as to presume [sic] the
reason of the rules, and the spirit of the law. 28
6
The courts repeatedly stated that the common law consisted of
essential principles, the application of which to our circumstances,
would result in a modification or entire change of some of its rules,
which are nothing more than the result of the application of general
principles to particular facts. The principle is essentially the same
under all circumstances, but the rule, or result of its application, will
vary with the facts to which it is applied, or the conditions under
which the application is made.2 87
Thus, while common law rules might change, they did so because
the common law process required courts to apply unchanging
principles to changing world conditions.
The resulting flexibility of the common law process did not give
judges an unconstrained license to impose their own view of the
public interest.288 Instead, it required the judges to make a reasoned
from place to place depending on the "climate and the population" of the locations in
which it is applied).
284. See, e.g., Utermehle, 1 App. D.C. at 368-69 (recognizing that the common law
can expand and adapt to "the changing needs and circumstances of a complex
civilization"); Burton, 40 Ill. at 326 (stating that the common law can adapt to "new
emergencies as they arise in the rapid development of modern society"); Ketelson, 111
N.E. at 425 (noting that common law rules are "continually changing and expanding
with the progress of society"); Williams v. Miles, 94 N.W. 705, 708 (Neb. 1903)
(acknowledging that common law rules are "modified from time to time as changed
conditions and new states of fact require"); Rensselaer Glass Factory, 5 Cow, at 628
(noting that the common law can adapt "to the ever-varying condition of human
society").
285. Boyer, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) at 121 (noting that while common law rules may vary
depending on circumstances, the "great leading principles" are "never departed
from"); 1 J.C. Wells, A Treatise on the Jurisdiction of Courts 208 (1880) (recognizing
that the chief distinction is between the principles and the rules resulting from them-
the former being held immutable, unless especially repealed, while the latter are
subject to circumstantial modification).
286. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 5 Cow. at 628.
287. Randolph, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. at 178; see also Ketelson, 111 N.E. at 424-25;
Williams, 94 N.W. at 708 (stating that the common law consists, "not in the actual
rules enforced by decisions of the courts at any one time, but the principles from
which those rules flow"); Morgan, 30 Barb. at 9 (recognizing that states adopted the
"essential principles" of the-common law and application of those principles often
required modification or change of common law "rules").
288. See, e.g., Burton, 40 Ill. at 326 (stating that common law decision making
"should be confined to the new application of settled principles" rather than the
creation of rules that are inconsistent with "maxims lying at the foundation of our
law"). In the context of § 1983, these constraints are crucial to the legitimacy of the
Court's exercise of common law decision-making power. The enacting Congress had
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effort to apply unchanging, previously established principles to the
circumstances of a changing society.2 89  And as part of that effort,
because the common law was "founded in reason," its judges were
required to recognize that cessante ratione, cessat et ipsa lex, 9 ° that is,
that "where the reason of the rule ceases the rule also ceases.
29
'
Moreover, if an examination of the previously existing rule
demonstrated that it had never been supported by fundamental
principles, the rule could be rejected even without a change in
conditions.292
As a result, the members of the Forty-Second Congress would not
have expected the twenty-first-century Supreme Court to treat
particular nineteenth-century respondeat superior doctrines as "iron-
clad rules, 293 forged "in such inflexible form as to make them
absolute rules of decision throughout all time., 29a Instead, they would
have expected the Court to treat the rationales for respondeat
superior as settled principles and then to apply those principles by
asking whether, in light of twenty-first-century conditions, they
supported continued recognition of the governmental-proprietary
distinction and expansion of its scope to cover all city workers.
little faith in the Court's commitment to civil rights and the "history of the
relationship between Congress and the Court during Reconstruction makes it
exceptionally unlikely that the Forty-Second Congress would have given the Court...
unchecked power" to restrict the scope of its newly created civil action. Achtenberg,
supra note 69, at 531; see also id. at 531-35 (arguing that the Forty-Second Congress
did not intend to give the Court unfettered discretion to decide § 1983 immunity
issues based on the Court's own view of sound public policy).
289. See Morgan, 30 Barb. at 14 (noting that the common law is best described "as a
system of legal logic, rather than as a code of rules").
290. See, e.g., Lord v. Baldwin, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 348, 352 (1828) ("The reason of
the rule must be sought for, and the particular case must be brought within the reason,
as well as within the terms of the law."); Richards v. Towles, 21 S.C.L. (3 Hill) 346, 351
(Ct. App. 1837) (noting that where the rationale of a rule does not apply, the rule
"becomes foreign to the case [and] it does not apply"); Blackstone, supra note 78, at
*61.
291. Randolph, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. at 177; see also Ketelson, 111 N.E. at 425 ("No
rule of the common law could survive the reason on which it was founded. It needed
no statute to change it but abrogated itself."); Pierre v. Fontenette, 25 La. Ann. 617,
617-18 (1873) (stating that where a rationale ceases to exist, the rule should no longer
be applied); Dulany v. Wells, 3 H. & McH. 20 (Md. 1790) (same); Clark v. Mikell, 3
S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 168 (Ct. App. 1809) (same).
292. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1933) ("[I]t logically
followed that when it occurred to the courts that a particular rule had never been
founded upon reason, and that no reason existed in support thereof, that rule likewise
ceased."); Ketelson, 111 N.E. at 425 (same).
293. Commonwealth v. Hess, 23 A. 977, 981 (Pa. 1892) (denying that the common
law sets forth "iron-clad rules").
294. Ketelson, 111 N.E. at 425.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
2. The Common Law Process and the Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction
As discussed in Part III.B, the governmental-proprietary distinction
was seen as identifying certain city-paid workers who nonetheless
should be treated as employees of the state rather than the
municipality.295 The city's lack of responsibility for their torts was the
necessary result of the conclusion that the city was not their employer;
and that conclusion rested on application of the control and
reciprocity rationales, that is, on the belief that the state rather than
the city controlled the workers and that their work was performed for
the benefit of the state as a whole rather than for the benefit of the
city.2 96 Thus, the unchanging principles were that an employer's
respondeat superior responsibility "'grows out of, is measured by, and
begins and ends with his control of the servant,'"'2 97 and that "he who
expects to derive advantage from an act which is done by another for
him, must answer for any injury which a third person may sustain from
it."'298 To implement the Forty-Second Congress's expectation, a court
should use the common law process to apply those principles to
contemporary relations between cities and their employees and to
determine whether the reasons for the governmental-proprietary
distinction's rule have ceased to exist.
Such a court would be hard-pressed to argue that the control
rationale could justify treating twenty-first-century city-paid workers
as state rather than city employees. Whatever may have been the case
in the nineteenth century, cities-not states-hire city employees,299
295. See supra Part II1.B.
296. See supra notes 83-90, 105-10 and accompanying text.
297. Callahan v. The Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co., 23 Iowa 562, 564 (1867)
(quoting Parsons, supra note 87, at 88) (referring to the quoted language as "the
principle" that sets the limit of doctrine); see also, e.g., Palmer v. City of Lincoln, 5
Neb. 136, 142 (1876) (noting that control is the "reason of the rule" of respondeat
superior); Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358, 378 (1858) (asserting that respondeat superior
is "founded on the [employer's] power of control and direction").
298. Hall v. Smith, 130 Eng. Rep. 265, 267 (C.P. 1824) (stating that "respondeat
superior is bottomed on this principle"); see Cardot v. Barney, 63 N.Y. 281, 287 (1875)
(stating that there was "substantial agreement of judges [that the language quoted in
the text accurately stated] the reason of the rule making masters liable for the acts of
their servants"). See generally Huey v. Richardson, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 206 (1837) (noting
that respondeat superior is based on the principle that those who expect to benefit
from servants' acts are liable for the injuries they cause); Cardot, 63 N.Y. at 281
(same); Hickock v. Trs. of the Vill. of Plattsburgh, 15 Barb. 427 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1853) (discussing liability based on malfeasance of agents); Sawyer v. Corse, 58 Va.
(17 Gratt.) 230 (1867) (discussing respondeat superior in relation to mail carriers).
299. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 n.12 (1986)
(describing alternative allocations of hiring authority within county); Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 567 (1985) (describing city's hiring of its recreation
director); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 625 & n.2 (1980) (describing
city manager's authority to appoint city employees).
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enter into collective bargaining agreements with their unions,3 ° set
their salaries,3' regulate their conduct,3 2 discipline them,3"3 lay them
off,3° and discharge them.305  The Court itself implicitly recognized
that modern municipalities control their employees when it set forth
standards for deciding which city official had final policymaking
authority over personnel decisions.3 6 Like the water commissioners
in Bailey v. Mayor,0 7 modern city workers are controlled by the city;
and, at least so far as the control rationale dictates the results, they
should be treated as city employees.3 8
300. See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 569-72
(1984) (describing violations of the collective bargaining agreement between the City
of Memphis and its firefighters' union).
301. See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 47 (1998) (describing the mayor
and city council decision to freeze municipal employee salaries).
302. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 114-17 (1988)
(describing the city regulation of outside employment, city employee evaluation
procedures, city restructuring of positions, city transfers of employees, and procedures
for appealing such decisions to the city civil service commission); Pembaur, 475 U.S.
at 483 n.12 (recognizing that the county's board of commissioners sets employment
policies for deputies either directly or by delegating that authority to a county
official); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 238-39 (4th Cir. 1999)
(describing the city's decision to restrict a police officer's outside employment and the
city procedures for appealing such decisions to the city civil service commission).
303. See, e.g., Bogan, 523 U.S. at 46-47 (describing city disciplinary proceedings
against a city employee); Owen, 445 U.S. at 625 & n.2 (describing a city manager's
authority to suspend or demote employees).
304. See, e.g., Bogan, 523 U.S. at 47 (describing a mayor and city council's action to
lay off 135 employees by eliminating their positions); Stotts, 467 U.S. at 566
(describing a city's layoff policy for its firefighters); Owen, 445 U.S. at 625 & n.2
(describing a city manager's authority to lay off employees). But see, e.g., Boston
Firefighter Union Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP Inc., 468 U.S. 1206, 1207
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing state legislative intervention to prevent
layoffs).
305. See, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12 (recognizing that a county's Board of
Commissioners has authority to fire deputy sheriffs or to delegate that authority to a
county official); Owen, 445 U.S. at 625 & n.2 (describing a city manager's authority to
remove employees). Of course, at least as to non-home-rule cities, the state
legislature can limit a city's freedom to take some of these actions; but that is true as
to all employers except where federal law provides otherwise. Similarly, while some
city employees may need to have state licenses or may need to meet state-imposed
requirements, the same is true of, for example, privately employed lawyers, doctors,
nurses, and pharmacists-not to mention, in a few states, barbers and florists. The
imposition of such requirements has never been thought to eliminate employers'
respondeat superior liability. The fact that the state may require a license to be an
engineer does not convert all engineers into state employees.
306. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 n.12.
307. 3 Hill 531, 543-44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
308. This does not necessarily mean that there are no locally selected officials who
should be treated as state employees. Where state law clearly and unequivocally
treats particular officials as part of the state government and vests control in state
rather than local government, those officials should be treated as servants of the state
rather than the locality that selects them. Thus, elected state judges are likely to be
considered state employees even if they are elected by the voters of a particular
county. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997) (stating that
Alabama sheriffs are policymakers for the state rather than the county from which
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Applying the reciprocity rationale leads to the same result. Under
that rationale, respondeat superior liability is imposed on those who
"expect[] to derive advantage from an act which is done by another
for [them],' 309 and the expected beneficiaries of a modern city
worker's efforts are the city and its inhabitants.310 Of course, good
work by a city worker-like good work by any public or private
employee-may produce positive externalities and those externalities
may benefit persons who are not city inhabitants.311  But if the
production of incidental benefits to outsiders was enough to exempt
they are elected). In identifying such officials, courts should continue to apply the
underlying principles discussed in the text. See, e.g., W. Coll. of Homeopathic Med. v.
City of Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375, 379 (1861) (a nineteenth-century analog
recognizing that tortfeasors may sometimes be acting "as officers of the state, though
elected by the people of the county").
309. Hall v. Smith, 130 Eng. Rep. 265,.267 (C.P. 1824); see supra note 108.
310. See, e.g., City of Overland Park Kan., Adopted 2004 Annual Budget (2004)
("MISSION STATEMENT: We, the employees of the City of Overland Park,
Kansas, believe that our primary mission is to maintain and enhance a high quality of
life for residents.") (on file with author); City of Akron, Transitioning to the Twenty-
First Century: Report to the Mayor by the Task Force Studying the Akron Police
Department, at http://www.ci.akron.oh.us/NewsReleases/2000/020200.html (2000)
(Police department's "mission is to serve the community of Akron"); City of Blue
Springs, Mo., Welcome to the Blue Springs Police Department, at
http://www.bluespringsgov.com/Police-Dept/police-mainpage.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2005) ("The mission of the Blue Springs Police Department is to provide the
highest quality of police services to the Blue Springs community."); City of Los
Angeles, City of Los Angeles Personnel Department, at http://www.lacity.org/per (last
visited Feb. 12, 2005) (showing Personnel Department motto as "[m]eeting the needs
of the City with the most talented people"); L.A. Fire Dep't, Los Angeles Fire
Department Official Seal, at http://www.lafd.org/seal.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
(describing the Los Angeles Fire Department's "central purpose" as "protecting its
people"). A few nineteenth-century governmental-proprietary distinction cases seem
to have rested on a fictional dichotomy between the interests of the city as a
corporation and the interest of its inhabitants. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Boston, 104
Mass. 87, 93 (1870) (explaining that the prevention of fires "is an object which affects
the interest of all the inhabitants" of the city, but then stating that it is not
advantageous to the "town in its corporate capacity"); Hafford v. City of New
Bedford, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 297, 302 (1860) (contrasting interests of city in its
corporate capacity with the "general welfare of the inhabitants or of the community");
Maxmilian v. Mayor of New York, 62 N.Y. 160, 168 (1875) (contrasting the interests
of the corporation and the interests of "individuals as members of the community").
However, the cases suggest no meaningful difference between the two sets of
interests, and give no hint as to why employees whose work benefited the city's
citizens should be treated as employees of the state while those whose work benefited
the city's treasury should be treated as employees of the city.
311. See, e.g., Workman v. Mayor of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 585 (1900) (Gray, J.,
dissenting) (noting that fire departments are established not only to protect property
within city limits but also to protect property outside the city limits to which the fire
might spread); Jewett v. City of New Haven, 38 Conn. 368, 373-74 (1871) (describing
extraterritorial effects of fires); Williams, supra note 174, § 71, at 114-15 (suggesting
that the reason that towns are not liable for road defects and cities are is that roads in
towns primarily serve persons passing through while roads in cities primarily serve the
city's inhabitants).
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employers from respondeat superior liability, such liability would
cease to exist entirely.
31 2
Finally, like control and reciprocity, the nineteenth-century
''warranty rationale" contravenes the argument that city workers
should be treated, for respondeat superior purposes, as state
employees. The rationale was based on the principle that one who
"holds out his agent as fit to be trusted ... thereby, in effect, warrants
his fidelity and good conduct," '313 and was tied to the principle that
employers are liable because they selected the wrongdoer.3 14 But a
contemporary city selects its own workers 315 and is the entity that
holds them out as "fit to be trusted." '316 The city gives them badges
bearing the city's name and puts them in vehicles bearing the city's
logo.317 It publicly disciplines them and just as publicly awards them
commendations.3"8 After all, the public knows Los Angeles's and
Chicago's Police Departments as the "LAPD" and "Chicago's
Finest," not as the "Cal PD," and "Illinois's Best."
Thus, the three rationales provide mutually reinforcing reasons to
recognize municipal respondeat superior while rejecting the rules that
treated many city-paid workers as state employees. Under the
common law decision-making process, the lack of reasons for these
rules abrogates them, either because the reasons for the rules have
ceased to exist319 or because it has now become apparent that the rules
312. In any event, the "extraterritorial benefit" argument simply cannot explain the
governmental-proprietary distinction. While a city firefighter's "governmental"
failure to properly fight a fire might have extraterritorial impacts, so might the city
water commissioners' "proprietary" failure to properly construct a dam. Compare
Jewett, 38 Conn. at 373-74 (holding firefighting to be governmental), with Bailey v.
Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (holding construction of a dam to
be proprietary).
313. 2 Story, supra note 78, § 452.
314. See supra note 95.
315. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. Of course, the authority to hire
employees is often dispersed among various city officials and the identity of the hiring
authority may vary depending on the type of city government. Nonetheless, the
authority rests within the city's various officials rather than the state's.
316. The fourth nineteenth-century rationale for respondeat superior, the legal
unity of principal and agent, neither supported nor undermined the governmental-
proprietary distinction. The idea that principal and agent were a single legal unity was
seen, even in the nineteenth century, as a legal fiction. New Orleans, Jackson & Great
N. R.R. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395, 453 (1866). It expressed the legal effect of a
master-servant relationship but, except in extreme cases, provided no help in
determining who was best treated as a servant's master.
317. See, e.g., L.A. Fire Dep't, supra note 310 (illustrating fire department seal);
L.A. Police Dep't, Los Angeles Police Department Badge Description, at
http://www.lapdonline.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (illustrating badge); L.A. Police
Dep't, Los Angeles Police Department Seal Description, at http://www.lapdonline.org
(last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (illustrating seal).
318. Detective Receives High Honor, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, May 13, 1997, at A-11
(describing awards given to various officers by the mayor and police chief).
319. See generally Pierre v. Fontenette, 25 La. Ann. 617 (1873) (where a rationale
ceases to exist, the rule should no longer be applied); Dulany v. Wells, 3 H. & McH.
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"had never been founded on reason." 32 ° If the Court is to be faithful
to the common law decision-making process-the process that the
enacting Congress would have expected the Court to follow-the
Monell doctrine should be overruled.
CONCLUSION
The conflicting arguments set forth in Part IV are not simply
exercises in bilateral law office history in which each of the
contending advocates selects and quotes favorable historical evidence,
ignoring context, and omitting contrary data.321  They are both
legitimate, methodologically sound arguments: They reach conflicting
results not because they use (or ignore) different data, nor because
they differ in how they evaluate the reliability of that data, but
because they ask different questions. Both arguments assume that the
enacting Congress understood nineteenth-century common law, and
both assume that Congress would have expected future courts to
apply that common law to decide issues of municipal liability under §
1983. But Monell's supporters focus on nineteenth-century common
law decisions, while Monell's opponents focus on the nineteenth-
century common law decision-making process. Monell's supporters
ask what result would be reached if the current Court applied
nineteenth-century common law doctrine to issues of municipal
liability under § 1983, while Monell's opponents ask what result would
be reached if the Court applied the nineteenth-century common law
method to those issues.
Factually, the answers to those two questions are different.
Theoretically, fidelity to the enacting Congress's expectations suggests
that the latter question should be decisive. But realistically, the
advocates cannot know which question a yet-to-be-chosen Justice will
20 (Md. 1790) (same); Clark v. Mikell, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 168 (App. Ct. 1809) (same);
see also generally People v. Randolph, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 174, 177 (N.Y. 1855)
("[W]here the reason of the rule ceases the rule also ceases.").
320. Ketelson v. Stilz, 111 N.E. 423, 425 (Ind. 1916) ("[I]t logically followed that
when it occurred to the courts that a particular rule had never been founded upon
reason, and that no reason existed in support thereof, that rule likewise ceased.");
accord Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
321. Professor Alfred Kelly introduced the phrase "law-office" history to refer to
"the selection of [historical] data favorable to the position being advanced without
regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of
the data proffered." Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 122 n.13. Such history "use[s] evidence wrenched from its...
historical context" and "select[s] those materials designed to prove the thesis at hand,
suppressing all data that might impeach the desired historical conclusions." Id. at 126.
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choose to answer.322  "And that," as Robert Frost said of another
choice, "[will make] all the difference. 323
322. The Court as a whole has sometimes considered one question dispositive and
sometimes the other. Compare, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-86 (1994)
(incorporating prior-favorable-termination requirement into certain § 1983 actions
because it was a requirement for the most analogous common law cause of action),
and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) ("One important
assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this area is that members of the 42nd
Congress were familiar with common-law principles.., and that they likely intended
these common law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary."),
with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987) (stating that § 1983 immunity
determinations should be made "in light of the 'common law tradition[s]"' but should
not be "slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law"), Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (applying the "objective reasonableness" standard to §
1983 cases), Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (stating that common law rules
should be "modifi[ed] or adapt[ed as] necessary to carry out the purpose and policy
of" § 1983), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (creating a form of
immunity unknown to the common law because "the public interest may be better
served" by the new standard). Existing individual Justices have been similarly
inconsistent. Compare, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should incorporate nineteenth-
century common law rules into § 1983), with Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Congress
expected older, generally phrased statutes such as § 1983 to be interpreted "by
developing legal rules on a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition"). See also
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497-98 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that a § 1983 immunity can never be recognized unless it
existed at common law in 1871); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45 (stating that § 1983
immunity determinations should be made "in light of the 'common-law traditionis]"'
but should not be "slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law").
But see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611-12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that because Monroe v. Pape was wrongly decided, the Court should feel free
to engage in "the essentially legislative activity" of creating a sensible remedial
scheme and equally free to ignore "the common law embodied in the statute").
323. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in The Poetry of Robert Frost: The
Collected Poems, Complete and Unabridged 105 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1979)
(1969).
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